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Shortly after Treatise I was published in Volume 102 of the South African 
Law Journal (1985), page 60, the case of Mekwa Nominees v Roberts 1985 (2) 
SA 498 (W) was reported. It required a comment which was noted in Volume 
102 of the South African Law Journal (1985) at page 382. I have included 
that comment as an addendum to Treatise I. 
Treatise III has been accepted for publication by the editor of the Tydskrif 
vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg, but no date has yet been set for 
publication. Here, too, I have included an addendum. 
I acknowledge, with many thanks, the inspiration, ideas and constructive 
criticism of my supervisor, Professor D Hutchison. I wish to thank my wife 
for the patience she has shown whilst I worked on this thesis. 
The law is stated as at 31 May 1987. 
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TREATISE I: WAIVER OF CONDITIONS FOR THE SOLE BENEFIT OF THE PURCHASER 
The typical 'Off er to Purchase and Deed of Sale' standard form contract 
used in South Africa often incorporates a clause with a suspensive condition 
to the effect that the sale is subject to the purchaser obtaining by a 
certain date, a loan on security of a first mortgage bond. Is there a legal 
rule that, because the condition has been inserted for the sole benefit 
of the purchaser, he may waive it, even after the time limit for obtaining 
the bond has expired? Or is the rule that, upon expiry of the time limit, 
the suspensive condition has failed, which causes the sale to fall away? 
It is submitted that the legal effect of non-fulfilment of the suspensive 
condition in this case depends upon the intention of the parties, and, 
therefore, there is no legal rule precluding the purchaser from waiving 
the condition after the time limit has expired. 
TREATISE II: THE LEGAL NATURE OF ESTATE AGENCY 
The standard form 'Off er to Purchase and Deed of Sale' of ten contains a 
clause regulating payment of the estate agent's commission. As the legal 
basis of estate agency is most unclear, there have been attempts to cast 
the estate agent as the beneficiary of a contract for the benefit of a third 
party. Another contention has been that the deed of sale contains a 
contract not only between the purchaser and the seller, but also directly 
between the seller and the estate agent, as well as between the purchaser 
and the estate agent in many cases. 
The true legal nature of the estate agent is considered, and it is concluded 
that, whilst he resembles a mandatary, his contract with his principal is 
sui generis. The attempt to cast the estate agent as a beneficiary of a 
contract for the benefit of a third party is deprecated. The idea that 
the deed of sale embodies a contract between the estate agent and the seller 
and/or purchaser has mar~ merit, but is not entirely free of difficulty. 
TREATISE III: CONDUCT BY THE SELLER WHICH PREVENTS 
THE ESTATE AGENT FROM EARNING HIS COMMISSION 
The seller's promise to pay the estate -agent is usually suspended by a 
condition that, for example, a valid and binding sale eventuates as a result 
of the agent's efforts. However, the seller's conduct may later intercede 
in various ways with the effect of preventing the condition from being 
fulfilled. For example, the seller may change his mind and refuse to sell 
to the proposed purchaser; he may revoke the agent's mandate; he may wish 
to sell his property through another agent, or to a purchaser he has himself 
found. In general, such conduct is lawful. However, a specific term of 
the mandate may limit the seller's right so to conduct himself, eg the 
conferment of a sole agency. Where the seller's actions are unlawful, the 
agent may normally claim damages for breach of mandate, but not his 
commission. However, in limited circumstances (usually where something 
more than the conclusion of a binding contract between seller and purchaser 
is required) the agent may be able to rely on the doctrine of fictional 
fulfilment to claim his full commission. 
TREATISE IV: THE EFFECT OF SUSPENSIVE CONDITIONS IN CONTRACTS OF SALE 
It has long been the view, in academic circles, that the effect of the 
insertion of a suspensive condition in a contract of sale is merely to 
suspend the operation of the obligations under the contract. It has been 
contended that, in spite of the presence of the condition, there is, from 
the outset, always an extant contract of sale. For the first time in the 
recent decision of Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v 
Strydom 1984 (1) SA 1 (A), the Appellate Division has declared itself 
favourably disposed to such a view. It has turned away from its own 
consistently followed decision of Corondimas & another v Badat 1946 AD 548, 
which suggested that although the parties were bound to each other from 
the outset, a contract of sale came into existence only upon fulfilment 
of the suspensive condition. Yet, despite its shift in viewpoint, the 
Appellate Division has declined to depart from Corondimas. 
What then is the present state of the law? It is submitted that the 
academic view is the correct prima facie approach, although it remains open 
for the parties to entertain a contrary common intention. It is submitted 




WAIVER OF CONDITIONS FOR THE SOLE BENEFIT OF THE PURCHASER 
The typical 'Offer to Purchase and Deed of Sale' standard-form contract 
used by estate agents in South Africa often incorporates a clause to the 
following effect: 
'This sale is subject to the buyer obtaining, by not later than [date], 
a loan on security of a first mortgage bond [etc].' 
This clause involves a suspensive condition.
1 
Normally, when a contract 
is subject to a suspensive condition, the duty to perform of both parties 
is contingent upon fulfilment of the condition, with the result that, on 
non-fulfilment, the contract terminates automatically and is regarded as 
null and void. 
2 
Particularly in recent years, however, there have been 
a number of cases, all decided in the Transvaal, which suggest that since 
the above suspensive condition is inserted purely for the benefit of the 
purchaser, the failure to fulfil the condition timeously does not 
necessarily cause the contract to lapse automatically. Instead, upon non-
fulfilment of the condition the purchaser will have an election either to 
waive the benefit of the condition, in which case he can hold the seller 
to the sale, or to allow the contract to lapse in the ordinary fashion. 
This theory seems faily equitable, but it immediately gives rise to several 
logical and juridical problems, namely: 
(a) The juridical basis for the proposition, implicitly espoused by the 
Transvaal cases, that a contract may remain in existence even after 
' non-fulfilment of a suspensive condition, bears further examination. 
2. 
It is an unorthodox viewpoint, but in fact there does exist Appellate 
Di vision authority to this effect in the case of Van Jaarsveld v 
3 
Coetzee. 
(b) The conclusion that the purchaser may elect to 'waive the benefit of 
the condition' even after the time for its fulfilment has expired, 
and so keep the contract in existence, has hitherto been founded on 
the premiss that the condition is for the sole benefit of the purchaser. 
Quite apart from the fact that the premiss, as stated, may not compel 
such a conclusion, is the premiss itself valid? Is it true that such a 
condition is in fact inserted for the sole benefit of the purchaser? 
Does not the fact that a limit is placed on the time for fulfilment 
of the condition introduce a benefit for the seller? If so, does this 
not preclude the purchaser from effecting a waiver? 
(c) Finally, what right is the buyer abandoning when he purports to 'waive 
' 
the benefit of the condition' and stand by the contract? What is the 
source of this right? The theoretical basis of such a waiver has not 
yet been addressed by the courts. 
It is evident, then, that a number of difficulties surround the 'mortgage-
bond clause' ref erred to above. Perhaps it is not surprising that in_ the 
past two years there have been three cases
4 
which, in circumstances similar 
to the original line of Transvaal cases, have precluded the purchaser from 
waiving the benefit of the condition after the time for fulfilment has 
expired. In other words, these more recent cases have held that the 
contract lapses automatically on the failure of the purchaser to obtain 
the loan in time. The danger exists that these decisions might leave the 
3. 
mistaken impression that such a waiver may never take place after the time 
for fulfilment of the condition. Fortunately, the most recent case on this 
5 point, Meyer v Barnar do & another, extinguishes such an impression. It 
is an important decision, which bears close ~nalysis. 
The twofold purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the decisions 
on the question are reconcilable, and to elucidate the juridical basis which 
under lies the decision either to permit or to preclude the purchaser's . 
waiver of a condition ostensibly inserted for his benefit alone. 
1. CASE LAW 
1.1 The Original Transvaal Approach 
6 
In the leading case, Wacks v Goldman, the relevant clause reads as 
follows: 
'This sale is conditional upon [ the estate agent] being able to 
raise a first mortgage bond on behalf of the purchaser ••• [within] 
30 days ••• ' 
The purchaser was obliged to pay a deposit immediately, and the balance 
of the purchase price was to be secured by banker's guarantee within 
sixty days of conclusion of the contract. The building society agreed 
to grant the loan on the thirty-first day, but on the same day the 
seller purported to cancel the sale, The court rejected the seller's 
contention that because the clause was a suspensive condition, which 
4. 
had not been fulfilled, the contractual relationship between the 
parties had terminated. 
7 
Vieyra J held: 
'This submission can be acceptable only if the interpretation 
to be placed upon the clause is such as to lead to the inference 
that, whether or not it was inserted for the buyer's benefit, 
it also enures for that of the seller ... 
The court observed that the seller was interested only in receiving 
a guarantee for payment of the balance of the purchase price within 
the stipulated sixty days. Moreover, the source of the finance was 
of no moment to the seller, nor were the ·terms on which the buyer 
obtained the finance of any moment. 
8 
The court concluded that the 
clause was inserted solely for the benefit of the purchaser and 
accordingly held that the sale was binding upon the seller. 
Counsel's argument that the purchaser would have to inform the seller 
of his intention not to rely on the failure of the condition before 
the time limit for its fulfilment expired was rejected as 'an untenable 
proposition ••• [which] carries its own refutation. At most it could 
be argued that [that] intimation should be made within a reasonable 
t . f h d f th · 1 · · 1 
9 
1me o teen o e time 1m1t ••• 
This dictum was approved 
10 
in Laskey v Steadmet, which had similar 
facts, but where, in addition, the relevant clause also provided that 
if the bond were not obtained by the purchaser within the stipulated 
time period the sale 'as nietig beskou word en verval' • The court 
s. 
held that the clause had been inserted solely for the benefit of the 
purchaser. Furthermore, it concluded that where the relevant clause 
contains a provision that on non-fulfilment the contract will be null 
and void, nevertheless on non-fulfilment nullity will not necessarily 
be automatic. If the condition was for the exclusive benefit of one 
party, he can elect whether to keep the contract in existence or not. 
If he wishes to keep it in existence, he must notify the other party 
of his decision within a reasonable time after the end of the time 
limit for fulfilment of the condition. If he does not wish to keep 
it in existence, notice is not required to terminate the contract; 
mere silence will suffice and the contract will lapse after the expiry 
of such reasonable time. 
No juridical basis was offered for these . . 11 propositions. In the 
judgment of neither case was there mention of waiver, . but in the 
. d . b . ' h M S 12 · JU gments in su sequent cases, starting wit argo v eegers, in 
the application of the principle laid down in Wacks' s case there was 
mention of the purchaser's waiving the benefit of the condition. 13 
Margo v Seegers has been strongly criticized. One pertinent criticism
14 
is as follows: Even if the principle is correct that the purchaser 
may waive a condition which is purely for his own benefit, the fact 
that a time limit is placed on the period within which fulfilment is 
to take place introduces a benefit for the seller. This benefit may 
be relied on by the seller, and it precludes the purchaser from waiving 
the condition after the time period has elapsed. The purchaser may 
6. 
effect a waiver only before the time period has elapsed. This argument 
was employed by counsel for the seller in the case of Allessandrello 
v Hewitt. 15 Counsel for the purchaser countered by remarking that 
if this were so, then the following date, the date by which the bank 
guarantee had to be provided, would be meaningless. It was contended 
that this later date, the time for performance, was the only date in 
which the seller could be interested. This line of reasoning was 
upheld by the court, and the purchaser was permitted to waive the 
condition and hold the seller to the contract. 
The reasoning does contain one flaw. The fact that there is a later 
time for performance does not mean in principle that that is the only 
time in which the seller is interested. The intention of the parties 
must be closely scrutinized. It may well be that, on the facts, a 
seller is interested only in the time for performance, but, on the 
other hand, it may equally be clear that an (anxious) seller is keen 
to know when he has a 'firm' sale, and thus has a great interest in 
whether or not the condition is timeously fulfilled. 
1.2 The More Recent Approach 
It was precisely this fact - that the seller was keen to know whether 
she had a 'firm' sale - which swayed the court in Phillips v Townsend}
6 
There was direct evidence in this case that it was the seller who had 
insisted on the time limit, and suggested seven days. The purchaser 
had asked for fourteen days, and the parties had compromised on ten 
days, 
7. 
Accordingly, the court held that it would have been most unreasonable 
and contrary to the manifest intentions of the parties to allow the 
purchaser to waive the condition after the ten-day time period had 
expired, and thereby hold the seller to the contract.
17 
There is no doubt~ with respect, that this decision is correct on the 
facts. Phillips v Townsend is authority for the proposition that where 
it is clearly the intention of the parties that the contract will lapse 
automatically on non-fulfilment of the condition, then the court is 
obliged to give effect to that intention (despite the fact that 
ostensibly the condition is inserted for the benefit of the purchaser). 
That is putting the proposition at its widest. It must be borne in 
mind that in this case the seller was able to counter the prima facie 
appearance that the condition was inserted for the sole benefit of 
the purchaser by adducing evidence to show that she was materially 
interested in timeous fulfilment of the condition. That evidence was 
crucial to her success. 
Recall the dictum above 18 of Vieyra J in Wacks v Goldman, and it is 
clear that his lordship would also have precluded the purchaser from 
effecting a waiver if the seller had been able to demonstrate that 
he had obtained a benefit by the insertion of the condition. 
It is therefore submitted that the rationes decidendi in Wacks v 
Goldman and Phillips v Townsend do not conflict. They are perfectly 
reconcilable: the benefit or lack of it accruing to the seller as 
a result of the insertion of the condition is a guide to the common 
intention of the pa~ties to which effect must be given. 
8. 
In the case of Roberto v Bandeiro & another19 a Transvaal court, 
unaware of the earlier, but at that stage unreported,
2° Cape decision, 
reached a similar conclusion. The clause in Roberto v Bandeiro 
specifically stated that it was for the sole benefit of the purchaser, 
but the court found that, on an interpretation of the clause as a 
whole, it was common intention of the parties that the sale should 
lapse on failure to obtain the loan within the time limit.
21 
Therefore 
the purchaser could not effect a waiver. This case did not disapprove 
the line of Transvaal cases, but the Cape court in Phillips v Townsend 
went further. Schock J disagreed-~ith the line of .Transvaal cases in 
so far as they suggest that, in casu, waiver by the purchaser can take 
place after the time for fulfilment of the condition has elapsed. 
22 
Certain obiter remarks by his lordship could have been misinterpreted 
as lending weight to the belief that a purchaser may never waiver the 
condition after the time for fulfilment has elapsed. 23 This danger 
has been dispelled by Meyer v Barnar do & another, 24 despite the fact 
that in that case, as well, the purchaser was precluded from effecting 
a waiver. 
The relevant clause in Meyer's case read as follows: 
'The agreement is conditional upon • • • the purchaser obtaining 
a loan ••• of R30 000 ••• within ••• 21 days ••• Should the loan 
not be granted within the aforesaid period then this agreement 
shall be null and void and of no force or effect without notice 
'25 
by either party to the other. 
9. 
The loan was granted one day late, but the purchaser wished to hold 
the seller to the sale. The purchaser failed. The court held that 
on an interpretation of the above clause in the context of the contract 
as a whole, the common intention of the parties was that the contract 
should terminate automatically at the end of the time limit should 
the purchaser not obtain the loan by then. 
It might be remarked that this clause does not differ materially from· 
that in Laskey' s case. However, there is ample authority for the 
proposition that when an agreement states that it shall be null and 
void on the happening of a certain event, the words 'null and void' 
should not always be read literally. They are frequently interpreted 
to mean that only the person entitled to rely on the failure by the 
other party to comply with an obligation will be entitled to withdraw 
26 from the contract. So in Laskey's case it was simply stated that 
the sale should be regarded as a nullity and should fall away on non-
fulfilment of the condition, without its being specified that both 
parties would be entitled to rely on that fact. In Meyer's case, how-
ever, the underlined part of the clause referred to above made it clear 
that both parties were entitled to rely on non-fulfilment. With 
respect, there is no doubt that Meyer's case was correctly decided.
27 
However, there is one fallacy, propounded in Phillip's case, and 
compounded in Meyer's case, which needs to be addressed. In Phillip's 
case Schock J
28 
cited the following passage from Hals bury' s Laws of 
England,
29 
remarking that he had no doubt at all that it also reflected 
the correct position in South African law: 
10. 
'Even where a condition precedent to formation of the contract 
is inserted solely for the benefit of one party, so that he might 
waive it, he may not do so after the expiry of the time limited 
for fulfilment of the condition.' 
This quotation was repeated in, Meyer's 
30 
case, and, in addition, 
Kumleben J quoted extensively from the New Zealand case of Scott v 
Rania,
31 
which is the only authority cited by Halsbury for the above 
proposition. In Halsbury itself doubt is expressed about the validity 
of the proposition enunciated in this case, on the grounds that it 
is questionable whether a condition precedent can ever be waived by 
32 
a party even where it is for his benefit alone. 
It is submitted, with the greatest respect, that in failing to note 
the distinction that English law makes between conditions which merely 
33 
suspend the duty to perform and conditions precedent, their lord-
ships were misled by the above quotation from Halsbury, which is not 
at all a correct reflection of South African law.
34 
I f · h M · d · lf
35 h . f S n act, in t e eyer JU gment itse t e quotation rom cott v 
Rania refutes quite plainly the idea that the ratio in that case in 
any way represents South African law. 
2. JURIDICAL EXPLANATION 
It is submitted that the various decisions have been made compatible 
. h h 36 wit one anot er. In focusing on the intention of the parties, 
11. 
Meyer's case has to some extent explained the juridical basi'.s that 
underlies the decision either to permit or to preclude the purchaser's 
waiver of a condition ostensibly inserted for his benefit alone. What 
follows is a closer examination of the issues. 
2.1 The Consequences on a Contract of Non-Fulfilment of a Suspensive 
Condition 
The standard theory of the effect of a suspensive condition on a 
contract is that, upon non-fulfilment of the condition, the contract 
terminates automatically and, by a legal fiction, with retroactive 
effect. It is as if there never was a contract between the parties.
37 
This creates a problem for the purchaser under discussion in this 
article. If the time for raising a loan on security of a mortgage 
bond has expired, how can the purchaser purport to waive what has 
already become null and void? The following example should illustrate 
the fallacy behind rigid insistence on the standard theory. X agrees 
to buy Y's house but insists that the sale will be subject to a favour-
able surveyor's report. 
a) Suppose the surveyor writes an unfavourable report, but X decides 
he wants to buy the house anyway. 
b) Suppose a surveyor cannot be found, and again X decides he wants 
to buy the house anyway. 
12. 
It is submitted that in both cases X would be able to hold Y to the 
38 
sale. Yet the suspensive condition has failed. The 'nullity' 
argument would have it that X cannot hold Y to the sale because there 
is no sale. This is clearly wrong, as is borne out by the case of 
39 Van Jaarsveld v Coetzee. In this case it was a suspensive condition 
of the sale that the purchaser of a farm should be able to raise a 
loan from the Land Bank. The purchaser was unable to do so. Hence 
the suspensive condition had failed. The purchaser tendered a bank 
guarantee instead, but the seller refused to give transfer on the 
ground that the contract had lapsed by reason of non-,.fulfilment of 
the suspensive condition. It was held that the seller's attitude was 
not justified in law. 
The Appellate Division pointed out that it would be an absurdity if 
the seller were put in a position where he could refuse a cash payment 
by the buyer and so cause the contract to lapse. The court observed 
that, in general, the seller can have no interest in the source from 
which the purchaser obtains the money. Furthermore, in this case there 
was no indication from the contract itself that the seller had such 
an interest, and if it had been the common intention of the parties 
that the seller could rely on the fact that the money had not come 
from the Land Bank, then surely clearer language would have been 
employed in the contract to reflect such . . 40 an intention. In this 
manner the court came to the conclusion that the condition had been 
inserted solely for the benefit of the purchaser, who was entitled 
to waive compliance with it. 
13. 
As a general principle, then, it is clear that where a contract is 
subject to a suspensive condition, the non-fulfilment of the condition 
does not necessarily cause the contract to lapse automatically. Even 
after non-fulfilment of the condition, the contract may still be in 
existence. 
41 
It is also clear from the reasoning in Van Jaarsveld' s 
case that the reason why the contract did not lapse automatically is 
that it was not the common intention of the parties that it should 
so lapse. 
The Meyer judgment also makes it clear that whether or not a contract 
lapses automatically on non-fulfilment of a suspensive condition 
depends entirely on the intention of the 
. 42 
parties. However, 
Kumleben J did not cite Van Jaarsveld' s case as authority for this 
proposition, and it is submitted respectfully that the true import 
f V J ld ' f 11 . d 
43 Th k · o an aarsve s case was not u y appreciate • e ey point 
of Van Jaarsveld's case is that a stipulation relating to the source 
of the purchaser's ability to pay the purchase price is a manifest 
indication that the intention of the parties was that the purchaser 
alone should be entitled to rely on the failure to obtain the money 
from that source. Of course, this manifest indication can be negatived 
by the surrounding circumstances (as in Phillip's case) or by the 
express terms of the contract (as in Meyer's case and in Roberto v 
Bandeiro). 
Most frequently, parties who contract subject to a suspensive condition 
do not expressly state what effect non-fulfilment of the condition 
will have on the contract. How do the courts then approach this 
matter? The position is well elucidated by Botha J (as he then was) 
14. 
44 in the case of Design and Planning Service v Kruger. His lordship 
stated that when the ordinary suspensive condition is unfulfilled and 
the contract is discharged automatically, it does so 'by virtue of 
an implied term to that effect, unless there is something in the 
h 1 f h ,45 contract negativing t e imp ication o sue a term ••• 
It is submitted that Botha J was not referring to a term implied by 
law, but to a tacit term which by necessary inference from the 
46 surrounding circumstances arises ex consensu. In other words, when 
parties contract subject to the ordinary suspensive condition which 
benefits both of them, and qualifies both their duties to perform, 
their common intention will ordinarily be that their duties to perform 
will be discharged by a failure of the condition. 
However, as the Appellate Di vision has observed, the means by which 
the buyer procures the ability to perform are generally of no moment 
47 
to the seller. Hence the inference is strong that when, in casu, 
the parties contract subject to the mortgage-bond clause, the term 
to be implied in giving effect to the supposed consensus reached by 
them is different. It is submitted that the tacit term is that the 
contract will be automatically discharged unless the purchaser elects 
f d . . 11 48 to per arm uncon 1.t1.ona y. He must exercise this election within 
a reasonable time after non-fulfilment of the condition. If he fails 
to volunteer to perform unconditionally the contract will lapse auto-
matically within a reasonable time,
49 
which will probably be relatively 
short, after non-fulfilment. Of course, the proof of this tacit term 
15. 
will depend upon its successfully negotiating the 'officious bystander' 
so 
test. 
The 'officious bystander' test was .applied in Meyer's case., even thou'gh, 
as Kumle ben J pointed out, it was unnecessary to do so, because it 
appeared quite plainly from the deed of sale that the parties had 
expressly provided for the consequence which failure of the condition 
was to have on the contract. 
In sum, therefore, the following submission is made: Where it appears 
expressly from the contract itself that the parties intended the 
contract to lapse automatically on non-fulfilment of the condition, 
that intention will be enforced. However, it will not be often that 
the parties state in the contract that they will both be entitled to 
rely on the contract's lapsing automatically as a result of non-
fulfilment of the condition. Where they do not expressly so state, 
the court will enquire as to what the parties tacitly agreed, and 
in this inquiry the court will be aided by the surrounding 
circumstances. 
2.2 Condition for the Sole Benefit of the Purchaser 
However trite it may be that non-fulfilment of a suspensive condition 
does not necessarily cause a contract to terminate automatically, it 
should be noted that the Appellate Division in Van Jaarsveld' s case 
did not have to deal with a time factor. Does the introduction of 
16. 
a time limit within which the condition is to be fulfilled perforce 
preclude the purchaser from effecting a waiver after the time limit 
has expired? Phillips v Townsend could be misunderstood as supporting 
such ·an idea. In effect, the argument is as follows: the condition 
is divisible in two parts - the substantive part (that is, the raising 
of the loan) is irrefutably for the sole benefit of the purchaser, 
and may be waived by him; but the time for fulfilment enures to the 
benefit of both parties, which precludes the purchaser from effecting 
a waiver after the time limit has expired. 
If X promises to buy Y's house subject to a favourable surveyor's 
report within ten days, does this time limit really alter the 
complexion of the consensus reached by the parties? The proper answer, 
it is submitted, is that it may do, depending. on the surrounding 
circumstances, but the existence of a time limit is not conclusive· 
in itself that the parties intended the contract to lapse automatically 
on non-fulfilment of the condition. In Van Jaarsveld's cas~ the legal 
consequence of the non-fulfilment of the condition was determined by 
reference to the common intention of the parties, and the reasoning 
in that case is of equal force even where a time limit has been · set 
for fulfilment of the condition. 
It must not be forgotten that there is no magic in the phrase 'for 
the sole benefit of the purchaser'. The decision whether or not the 
contract terminates automatically does not turn on whether the 
condition 'benefits' the purclilaser only. For whose benefit the 
17. 
condition was inserted is merely a pointer as to what the common 
intention of the parties must have been, at the time of contracting, 
. d . . f h · 1 · h · 51 in regar to termination o t eir re ations ip. 
A refreshing way of looking at the problem is to view it according 
to the American approach to conditions. American text-books
52 
focus 
not so much on whether the contract is subject to a condition but on 
whether the duties of the parties are conditional. This is not unlike 
the approach of the Appellate Di vision in the most recent case on 
. d' . 53 suspensive con itions. A condition may qualify the purchaser's duty 
to perform, or the seller's duty to perform, or, most frequently, both 
of their duties to perform. 
The ordinary suspensive condition, which enures to the benefit of both 
parties, is, in reality, a condition that qualifies the duty to perform 
of both parties. In this case the inference is strong that the parties 
intended that neither of them should be able to waive the. condition, 
as both of them would be relying on its fulfilment to determine whether 
they would have an outright duty to perform. Where, however, a 
condition enures to the sole benefit of one of the parties, he alone 
has a conditional duty, he alone has a qualified duty to perform. 
Ordinarily that party should be able to waive the condition of his 
duty and to volunteer to perform unconditionally. 
This ties in with a statement, which at first blush seems open to 
question, by Vieyra J in Wacks v Goldman. 54 In arriving at the 
18. 
conclusion that the mortgage-bond clause was for the sole benefit of 
the purchaser, Vieyra J remarked that the duties of the seller were 
in no way dependent on the fulfilment, whether timeously or at all, 
f h d . . 55 o t e con 1.t1.on. This may be an overstatement, but it is clear 
that in these cases it is only the duty to perform of the purchaser 
which is truly qualified: the purchaser has a suspended duty to pay 
the purchase price. He has, however, the unqualified right to make 
payment of the price. The condition also suspends his duty to accept 
transfer. On the other hand, the seller's principal duty, to make 
transfer of the property, is not suspended at all by the condition. 
It is merely a reciprocal duty and is contingent on the purchaser's 
own performance. It is a synallagmatic duty, not a conditional duty. 
The seller also has an unqualified duty to accept payment from the 
purchaser. It is clear that the condition does not qualify the 
seller's duty to perform. In effect the seller has contracted to 
perform if the purchaser performs, and the purchaser has contracted 
to perform if the necessary mortgage finance can be raised. 
If the condition qualifies only the purchaser's duty to perform, it 
is difficult to see how the seller can rely on it in order to avoid 
his obligations. That is not to say that the point made in Phillips 
v Townsend is not without some validity, that is, that, ob jet.ti vely, 
the seller does benefit by knowing, with certainty, when the 
conditionality of the contract is to come to an end. But it smacks 
of opportunism to allow him, as a general rule, to aver that his 
hitherto unqualified duty to perform has been discharged as a result 
of non-timeous fulfilment, when it is clear from Van Jaarsveld's case 
19. 
that he could not generally do so if the condition simply failed, that 
is, if the mortgage bond was refused. 
To summarize: where it appears in the deed of sale that a time limit 
has been set for fulfilment of the condition, this will be one of the 
factors taken into consideration by the court in determining the 
intention of the parties. Ordinarily, it will be an indication that 
the parties intended the contract to terminate automatically on expiry 
of the time limit, but, by itself, it will not suffice to compel the 
drawing of such an inference. If, in addition, the remainder of the 
express terms of the contract, or the surrounding circumstances, or 
both, fortify this indication, then the contract will terminate 
automatically on expiry of the time limit. Without this fortification, 
the purchaser will be permitted to effect a waiver after the time for 
fulfilment of the condition has expired. 
2.3 Future Approach to the 'Mortgage-Bond Clause' 
There remains the question whether the purchaser should generally be 
permitted to effect a waiver after the expiry of the time limit or 
whether he should only exceptionally be able to do so. 
In other words, when a court considers the simple clause adverted to 
at the start of this article, a clause that merely contains the 
condition (including the time limit), and there is no other indication 
of the intention of the parties, what will be the prima facie inference 
drawn by the court? 
20. 
One could argue that the clause's dominating feature- is that is is 
ostensibly for the sole benefit of the purchaser alone. Therefore 
the prima facie inference is that the parties did not intend the 
contract to lapse automatically on non-fulfilment of the condition. 
It will still, however, be open to the seller to show that this 
inference is not a necessary one by adducing evidence of the 
surrounding circumstances to show that when the parties were reaching 
agreement on the matter of the mortgage-bond clause, he, the seller, 
made it clear that he regarded timeous fulfilment of the condition 
as material. That being the case, the seller must be held to be 
entitled to rely on non-timeous fulfilment. 
Alternatively, one could adopt the approach that the dominant feature 
of the clause is that it is a suspensive condition with a time limit 
for fulfilment, and as the ordinary effect of a suspensive .condition 
is that non-fulfilment will cause the contract to terminate 
automatically, the correct prima facie inference is that it will so 
terminate. The purchaser will then be obliged to adduce evidence to 
show that the timeous fulfilment of the condition was not material 
to the seller and that it was the common intention of the parties that 
he, the purchaser, should have an election on non-fulfilment of the 
condition whether or not to perform unconditionally. 
This is not to be confused with the onus of proof. Of course, whoever 
is plaintiff will have to prove his version of the common intention 
of the parties. But it is important to decide what prima facie 
inference the clause gives rise to, for the party against whom such 
21. 
an inference is drawn will bear the evidentiary burden ('weerleggings-
las'). The court in Meyer's case seemed to prefer the latter approach. 
Kumleben J remarked that 'though it may well be that the benefit of 
a condition can be waived, a suspensive condition is. • • prima f acie 
agreed upon because both parties intend that the operation of the terms 
of the agreement should depend upon the fulfilment of the condition' •56 
However, sight should not be lost of the fact that in these cases the 
condition qualifies the duty to perform of the purchaser only. His 
lordship went on to speculate that in an agreement of this kind the 
seller might regard certainty as to the fate of the sale at the end 
of the time limit as important; or he might well wish to negotiate 
with another purchaser a more profitable sale of the same property, 
which . sale he could make dependent upon the non-fulfilment of the 
condition in the first agreement; or he might wish to acquire an option 
to purchase another house, with an expiry date just after the final 
day for fulfilment of the condition. Because one or more of these 
considerations might have weighed with the seller in casu, she had 
to be regarded as having a material interest in the timeous fulfilment 
f h d · · 
57 Wh · · · h i· t h K 1 b J o t e con ition. at is important is t at seems t at um e en 
would not have required the seller to adduce evidence of such reliance 
on tirneous fulfilment. 58 In short, even though the seller may not 
actually have placed any importance on timeous fulfilment of the 
condition at the time that the parties concluded their agreement, the 
fact that it was possible that she might have relied on timeous fulfil-
ment was enough to draw the inference that it was the common intention 
of the parties that the contract should terminate automatically at 
the end of the time limit. This would seem to be a little harsh on 
the purchaser. 
22. 
A further interesting observation by Kumleben J was that had the 
parties intended that the purchaser should have the right to waive 
the condition after non-fulfilment, words to that effect could quite 
easily have been inserted in the contract. 59 That illustrates his 
lordship's approach pertinently. Compare the approach in Van Jaarsveld 
v Coetzee. In that case the Appellate Division stated that if the 
seller wished to rely on non-fulfilment of the condition then clearer 
language should have been used. Of course, the clauses and the circum-
stances in the two cases are entirely different, but the nuances in 
approach should not be ignored. 
Whichever is the correct prima facie inference from the bare facts 
of the mortgage-bond clause as contained in the deed of sale is a 
policy decision. There is no compelling logic which sustains one 
approach at the expense of the other. I prefer the former approach,. 
that is, the purchaser may generally effect a waiver unless the 
contract itself is explicitly against this or the seller adduces 
evidence indicating that such was not the intention of the parties. 
However, the main point espoused, happily, in Meyer's case is that 
'the test is the intention of the parties, and there is not an 
inflexible rule that the purchaser may always or may never waive the 
condition under scrutiny in this article, after the time for its 
fulfilment has expired. 60 
23. 
2.4 Waiver 
One nice problem remains. What is taking place juridically when the 
purchaser 'waives the benefit of the condition'? 
61 
Halsbury states that waiver is a vague term used in many senses, 
and Corbin remarks62 that there is no one 'correct' definition. A 
waiver is defined in the South African Judicial Dictionary63 as 'the 
passing by or declining to take advantage of a legal right, whereby 
such legal right becomes lost'. Similarly, Lord Hailsham of 
64 
St Marylebone has stated that '[w]aiver is the abandonment of a right. 
What ••• [a party] waives is the right to rely on the term ••• ' 
What right is the purchaser in casu abandoning? When one looks at 
breach of contract, the right which the breach gives rise to and the 
right which the 'innocent' party may either rely upon or waive is the 
right to cancel. What right accrues upon non-fulfilment of the 
condition? Hardie Boys J, in his minority judgment in Scott v Rania, 65 
suggests that at the time of non-fulfilment of the condition there 
accrues to the purchaser 'a right to be exempted from his obligations'. 
One hesitates to put forward so nebulous a notion as a 'right not to 
be bound', yet clearly it is something of this nature. 
As a condition concerning mortgage finance is a mixed condition, 
66 
the purchaser cannot elect not to be bound before the time period 
expires. He is under a duty to try to secure fulfilment of the 
condition upon pain of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment. The right 
24. 
not to be bound, or the right to rely on automatic discharge of the 
contract, thus accrues on expiry of the time limit for fulfilment. 67 
This right is not the same as a right to cancel. Both rights give 
the ability to withdraw from a contract, but the right to cancel must 
be actively exercised in order to be effective. The right not to be 
bound, on the other hand, generally flows from the tacit term that 
the contract will terminate automatically (after the expiry of a 
further reasonable time after the time for fulfilment) unless the buyer 
elects to perform unconditionally. Mere passivity will result in auto-
matic termination; hence the right need not be actively exercised. 
This is something of an oddity. Often silence is taken as an 
indication that a party is prepared to waive or abandon a right which 
has accrued to him. 68 Here the purchaser must actually make a positive 
act in order to effect a waiver. 
3. CONCLUSION 
Where the deed of sale states explicitly what the consequence of 
failure to raise a loan on security of a mortgage bond is to be, then 
such language will generally be conclusive as to such consequence. 
Where the deed of sale is not explicit on this point, the common 
intention of the parties at the time of contracting must be enquired 
into in order to discover what they tacitly agreed on. In this 
respect, the surrounding circumstances will lend assistance. The fact 
that there is a time limit for fulfilment of the condition does not 
by itself compel the conclusion that the common intention_ of the 
25. 
parties was that the contract should terminate automatically on expiry 
of the time limit. 
The decisions on this point are, on the whole, reconcilable. 
There is no inflexible rule that the purchaser may always or may never 
waive the suspensive condition here under consideration. 
26. 
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ADDENDUM 
The mortgage-bond clause in a deed of sale which makes the sale subject 
to a suspensive condition that the purchaser is able to raise the necessary 
finance on security of a mortgage bond has been the subject of much 
litigation. Mekwa Nominees v Roberts 1985 (2) SA 498 (W) becomes the fourth 
consecutive case (after Roberto v Bandeiro & another 1982 (1) SA 880 (W), 
Phillips v Townsend 1983 (3) SA 403 (C) and Meyer v Barnardo & another 1984 
(2) SA 580 (N) to preclude the purchaser from holding the seller to the 
sale after the time for fulfilment of the condition has elapsed. 
The facts of Mekwa's case were as follows. The purchaser and seller had 
agreed in the deed of sale that the sale was subject to a mortgage bond 
being raised by 15 August. The time for performance of the contract was 
23 September. By that date the purchaser had to have secured the purchase 
price by a banker's or building society's guarantee. On 5 September the 
purchaser wrote to the seller's attorneys advising them that he would not 
be seeking a mortgage bond, but that he would supply the necessary 
guarantees on the due date. The seller refused to proceed with the sale. 
The purchaser sought to enforce it. He failed. 
In dismissing the purchaser's application, the court disapproved earlier 
cases decided in its own di vision: Wacks v Goldman 1965 ( 4) SA 38'6 (W) 
and Laskey v Steadmet (edms) Bpk h/a Wessel de Villiers Agentskappe 1976 
(3) SA 696 (T). Coetzee J wholeheartedly endorsed the approaches of 
Phillips' s and Meyer's cases. This is not surprising. The judgments in 
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those two cases are, in the main, well reasoned. However, the disturbing 
part of Mekwa' s case is that, with respect, it contains little reasoning 
of its own. 
A minor point is the absence in the judgment of any reference to the 
Appellate Division decision in Van Jaarsveld v Coetzee 1973 (3) SA 241 (A). 
This is perhaps explicable on the basis that Coetzee J seemed to assume 
that the clause under consideration was capable of waiver by the purchaser. 
The issue his lordship addressed was whether it was capable of such a waiver 
after 15 August. However, the approach in Van Jaarsveld's case is 
instructive. There was no question of a time limit in that case. The 
suspensive condition had failed, and the purchaser had, as in Mekwa's case, 
simply tendered a banker's guarantee in lieu of obtaining the mortgage. 
She succeeded in holding the seller to the sale. The Appellate Di vision 
observed that, in general, the seller can have no interest in the source 
from which the purchaser obtains the money, and there was no indication 
from that particular contract that the seller had had such an interest. 
Moreover, if it had been the common intention of the parties that the seller 
too could rely on failure of the suspensive condition, then surely clearer 
language would have been employed in the contract (at 244B-F). 
The essence of the issue in Mekwa's case, however, was whether the 
purchaser should be permitted to waive the condition after the time for 
its fulfilment had elapsed. Coetzee J quoted from the judgment in Phillips' 
case (at 408F-G): 
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'If the contract remained valid despite the lapse of the time ••• with-
out a bond having been obtained and without the plaintiff having waived 
it during that time, it would render the time limitation entirely with-
out content or purpose. Defendant would then be in no different 
position than she would have been had there been no time limitation.' 
Coetzee J himself echoed this observation (at 501-2). 
It is respectfully submitted, however, that there is a purpose to the 
insertion of the time limit. In Treatise I at page 18 the point is made 
that the seller has given an unconditional promise to perform. The 
condition does not qualify 
synallagmatic. On the other 
conditional promise to perform. 
his_ duty to perform, which is merely 
hand, the purchaser has given only a 
The purpose of the time limit is to put 
the purchaser on ·terms with some certainty. When the period during which 
his duty to perform is qualified elapses, then, in order to hold the seller 
to the sale, he must offer the seller the additional consideration of an 
unconditional promise to perform. If there were no time limit, the 
position as to the length of time for which the purchaser's duty to perform 
was qualified would be vague and uncertain. Of course, this iq only one 
explanation of the reason for the insertion of the time limit. It may well 
be on the facts of a particular case that the seller, at the time of 
contracting, was indeed materially interested in timeous fulfilment of the 
condition. But that is a matter to be enquired into, and not simply to 
be assumed by reference to the insertion of a time limit. 
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With respect, Coetzee J was correct in endorsing Meyer's case and Phillips's 
case, but see how different the facts there are when they are compared with 
those in Mekwa's case. In Meyer's case Kumleben J observed that the effect 
of the condition dependE;:!d on the common intention of the parties, and if 
the deed of sale was conclusive as to intention, then that intention had 
to be given effect to (at 584G and 585E). An examination of the relevant 
mortgage-bond clauses in Meyer's case and Roberto v Bandeiro makes it clear 
that the seller did place material reliance on timeous fulfilment of the 
condition. In Phillips' s case the deed of sale was not conclusive, and 
the court had to enquire what the parties had tacitly agreed on. Crucial 
evidence was led by the seller that she had insisted on a seven-day limit, 
the purchaser had asked for fourteen days, and the parties had compromised 
and settled for a ten-day time limit. By contrast, in Mekwa' s case the 
mortgage-bond clause was in its barest form, and there was no suggestion 
either from the document or, apparently, from any affidavits from the seller 
that it was a material part of his promise at the time of contracting that 
the condition should be timeously fulfilled. In the result, the decision 
seems a little harsh on the purchaser in this case. 
With respect, Coetzee J would have been on firmer ground if he had drawn 
the prima facie inference that the insertion of the time limit suggested 
that the parties did not intend that the purchaser should be able to waive 
the condition of his duty after the expiry of the time limit. Such a view-
point is a policy decision (see Treatise I at 19·-22 ). What is wrong with 
Mekwa, with respect, is that his lordship has found that the insertion of 
a time limit is conclusive of the parties' intention. Thus, a virtual legal 
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rule emerges. Whether or not one agrees with the result of Mekwa' s case, 
the judgment leaves the impression that there is an irrefrangible rule that, 
in cases of this kind, waiver by the purchaser after the expiry of the time 
limit is not possible. No such rule exists, it is submitted. The common 
intention of the parties mu.st be ascertained, and the mere insertion of 
a time limit for fulfilment of the condition, a condition which has been 
ostensibly inserted for the purchaser's benefit, cannot by itself be 
conclusive as to that common intention. 
TREATISE II 
39. 
THE LEGAL NATURE Of ESTATE AGENCY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the modern commercial world, there are many kinds of specialised 
intermediaries whose activities are crucial to a more efficient· 
commercial cycle. There are factors, representatives, agents and brokers 
of all sorts, independent contractors, and there is the estate agent. 
The commercial function of an estate agent is quite clear and quite 
simple. By reason of his specialised knowledge of potential purchasers 
and sellers of property, he seeks to expedite the purchase and sale of 
property. 
The legal basis of the estate agent's commercial activities is less clear. 
In fact, the whole of the law of agency is so loosely defined' that De 
Wet has remarked that 'agency' cannot be regarded as a term of art 
denoting a specific branch of the law. 
1 
If that were not complication 
enough, the estate agent himself occupies a somewhat unique position 
within the morass of so-called agents, so much so, that he has been 
described by an eminent jurist as a 'legal oddity'. 2 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the legal position of the estate 
agent in the tripartite arrangement of purchaser, seller and agent. 
40. 
A determination of the true legal nature of estate agency should disclose, 
inter alia, the proper basis on which the estate agent's claim for 
commission is founded. The enquiry will therefore focus on the legal 
elements of the relationship between the seller and the estate agent. 
Is the estate agent an agent, in the strict legal sense? If not, what 
is the proper nature of estate agency. However, such an enquiry into 
the elements and principles of agency does not go far enough. These 
days, it seems that the estate agent seeks to recover his commission 
on plural bases. By placing reliance on an undertaking by the seller 
in the deed of sale to pay the agent's commission, there have been 
attempts to cast the estate agent as the beneficiary of a contract for 
the benefit of a third party, with the seller as promittens and the 
purchaser as stipulans. Another contention is that the deed of sale 
contains a contract not only between purchaser and seller, but also 
between seller and estate agent, as well as between purchaser and estate 
agent, in many cases. These further bases for the recovery by the 
agent of his commission will also be considered. 
2. DESCRIPTION Of EST ATE AGENCY 
What follows is a broad generalisation of the commercial aspect of 
estate agency. A property-owner, desirous of selling his property will 
3 contact one or more estate agents. He will inform the estate agent 
that his property is for sale, and he will request the estate agent to 
find a suitable purchaser. It is unusual for the estate agent to demur. 
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It is important to note that the estate agent is not employed by the 
seller. He receives no wage for his efforts. He is commissioned to 
produce a result, and it is only upon attainment of such result that 
he earns any remuneration. In other words, if he does not find a suitable 
purchaser, he earns nothing, however great his exertions may have been. 
Conversely, should he find a suitable purchaser with whom the seller 
concludes a contract, then he will receive his commission however great 
or small his exertions. This fact, that the degree of the agent's 
exertions in no way influences whether or how much the seller will 
pay him, bears the logical extension that the seller cannot control the 
agent's efforts, or even require him to expend any effort at all. 
Should the estate agent find a potential purchaser (by hard work, luck 
or whatever means), he will introduce the purchaser to the seller. The 
seller and purchaser may wish to negotiate the price, and sometimes, 
these negotiations may be conducted through the medium of the estate 
agent, although he will frequently do no more than convey information 
from one party to the other. If the seller and the purchaser can reach 
agreement, they will conclude a written contract. Often this contract 
is a standard form contract, printed on the estate agent's stationery 
(usually there will be minor alterations to suit the parties concerned). 
Almost always the estate agent does not conclude the sale of the 
property on behalf of the seller. And this is the nub of the matter 
- if the estate agent is merely an intermediary who attempts to bring 
the seller and purchaser together in order that they themselves might 




mentioned activities and functions may well correspond with the layman's 
idea of agency, but do they amount to agency in the legal sense? 
THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ESTATE AGENT AND SELLER 
The Concept of Agency 
The South African law of agency has a mixed heritage, being based 
partly on the under-developed concepts of the old Roman-Dutch 
authorities and partly on English law; moreover, if De Wet's analysis 
is accepted, it appears to be now aligning itself fairly closely to certain 
European concepts of agency. 
Part of the difficulty in discovering the quintessence of agency is the 
fact that the term is of ten used in different senses. 
4 
In the most 
obvious sense, agency is the performance of a task by one person on 
behalf of another. 5 Although the term is sometimes used in this sense, 
even by the courts, it is too broad and loose a definition to be useful. 
6 However, to compose a strict, legal definition is not easy. The 
difficulty is compounded by the fact that, in defining agency, Anglo-
American jurisprudence makes no clear distinction between on the one 
hand, the power of the agent to alter his principal' s legal position, and 
on the other hand, the relationship that exists between principal and 




'the relationship that _exists between two persons when one, called 
the agent, is considered in law to represent the other, called the 
principal, in such a way as to be able to affect the principal's 
legal position in respect of strangers to the relationship by the 
making of contracts, or the disposition of property'. 
This definition clearly amalgamates the ·two concepts of the agency 
power, 8 and the relationship between principal and agent. 9 The reason 
for this amalgamation is presumably the belief that the contractual 
relationship that frequently exists between principal and agent is 
responsible for the creation of the agency power. Certainly, it is this 
belief which represents the traditional approach in South African law.
10 
It is also this belief which marks the schism between the traditional 
. 11 
approach and the approach of Professor De Wet. The most important 
point that De Wet makes is that the act of authorisation, which creates 
the agency power, is a unilateral juristic act by the principal. There 
is no question of consensus being necessary in order for the agent to 
acquire the power to create, alter or discharge legal relationships between 
his principal and third parties. The contractual relationship which of ten 
(but not always) exists between principal and agent is an entirely separate 
matter, and merely regulates the rights and duties of the agent and 
. . l . 12 pnnc1pa mter se. 
However, leaving aside De Wet's view for the moment, consider the 
fact that, for most commentators, both in South Africa and England, 
the hallmark of agency in the legal sense, is the authority conferred 
on the agent to make binding contracts on behalf of his principaL
13 
44. 
So much so,. that it 14 is contended that a person who merely has 
authority to . act for another, and not authority to create, alter or 
extinguish legal obligations between his principal and third parties, is 
not legally an agent. In fact, De Villiers and Macintosh state 
15 
that, 
to the extent to which an 'agent' is required to perform non-juristic 
-
acts, he ceases to be an agent, and becomes a servant or independent 
contractor. For example, it is contended, an agent who travels to 
another town to sign a contract on behalf of his principal is an agent 
only insofar as the actual contracting (the signing of the agreement 
and the negotiations which precede the signing) is concerned. On his 
journey to the town and back, he is a servant or independent contractor. 
Therefore, as De Villiers and Macintosh conclude, an agent may be 
defined as a servant or independent contractor, who brings his principal 
into binding legal relations with third parties. It also follows that on 
this definition, it is not only persons who merely act for another in 
a purely commercial sense, but even persons who have the agency power, 
16 
but do not use it, who are not agents in the legal sense. If this 
view is accepted, there is no unique legal persona called an agent. 
There is only a function, called agency, which certain properly endowed 
legal personae may perform, such as servants, independent contractors 
or partners. 
Recourse to De Wet's views does not alter this conclusion. De Wet 
speaks of representation, rather than agency. He d f
. 17 
e mes a 
representative as a person who concludes a juristic act with the intention 
to create, alter or extinguish legal relationships for another and not 
45. 
for himself. It is plain on both approaches, that if the touchstone of 
agency is the power of the agent to enter into juristic acts on behalf 
of his principal, then the basis of the underlying relationship between 
h . . I d h . . I IS t e pnncipa an t e agent IS Irre evant. There is no special contract 
of agency common to all the types of legal personae who may be 
invested with the agency power. 
3.2 Estate Agent as an Agent in the Strict Sense 
In South African law, it is accepted that the estate agent generally 
acts on a mandate to 'find a buyer•. 19 He therefore has a contractual 
relationship with his principal, but as has been demonstrated, this is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to categorise him legally as an agent. 
Furthermore, although he clearly acts in a representative capacity, he 
usually does not possess the power to conclude juristic · acts for the 
Seller.
20 Th f · th . 1 1 h . ere ore, in e stnct ega sense, t e estate agent IS 
21 ordinarily not an agent. This conclusion has already been bemoaned 
b 1 d. E, 1· h . 
22 b h 1 h y a ea mg ng IS wnter, ut t e on y way to escape sue a 
conclusion is to challenge the notion that the agent's power to conclude 
juristic acts is the very essence of agency. True, it is central to the 
whole concept, but need it be the touchstone? 
It is submitted that it is unsatisfactory that a person who is manifestly 
acting in a representative capacity, in the sense that he acts for another 
and that his efforts are ultimately directed at an alteration in his 
principal's legal situation, cannot be classified as an agent, merely for 
want of the authority actually to conclude juristic acts, or for want 
of the exercise of that authority. It would be an improvement to have 
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a wider category of agents. So, for instance, one could classify as 
an agent any person who performs a task· for another in connection 
with the conclusion of a juristic act by or for the principal. 23 Estate 
agents, travel agents, employment agents and all sorts of other 
commission agents who are presently virtually unclassifiable legally, 
and who ought to fall within the legal niche of agency, would then 
do so under this broad definition. One could have sub-categories, as 
Kerr 24 suggests, of empowered agents and unempowered agents. 
Obviously, empowered agents would be those possessed of the requisite 
authority to conclude juristic acts on behalf of their principals and 
unempowered agents would be that large group of commercial inter-
mediaries, including estate agents, whose activities are aimed at bringing 
about a change in their principal's legal position, but who are not 
possessed of the power to do so personally. 
I 
A criticism of such an approach is that it relies on semantics. The 
legal essence remains unaltered. That may be so, but in the first place, 
semantical exactitude is something upon which the law is founded, and 
the present, unsatisfactory treatment of commission agents does it no 
credit. In the second place, the suggested approach would import more 
certainty into the law because such issues as the scope of the fiduciary 
duties and the -delictual liability of such commission agents could then 
be dealt with under the general rules of agency. The struggle to define 
accurately the legal nature of estate agency is no mere academic 
exercise in punctiliousness. It is an attempt to provide a basis on which 
the manifold rights and duties of the estate agent can consistently be 
47. 
explained. Naturally, a wider definition, with or without sub-categories, 
might well have attendant difficulties, but it would, at least, reduce 
the cleavage between legal theory and commercial reality. 25 
3.3 Estate Agent as 'Agent' in the Wider Sense 
In South African law, it is safd that agents form a distinct class within 
a large group of persons who perform acts for others. 26 Having 
concluded that the estate agent is not an agent properly so-called, is 
he an 'unempowered' servant, or independent contractor, or in fact, 
any other classifiable type of legal persona? 
a) Servant 
b) 
Wh . h 
27 . 1 d d . h l . h' IC ever test IS emp oye to etermme t e master-servant re at10ns Ip, 
28 
it is quite clear that an estate agent is not a servant. The seller 
of property has no right to direct the manner or time in which the 
estate agent should fulfil his mandate. 
Independent Contractor 
Like the estate agent, the independent contractor (conductor operis) 
is distinguishable from a servant principally by the fact that he is not 
subject to the supervision of the locator operis. The conductor operis 
need not suffer any orders as regards the manner in which he performs 
his task. 29 It is fair to say that the locator operis is concerned not 
so much with the labour of the conductor operis, but with the result 
or product of his labour. 30 The estate agent enjoys much the same 
relationship with the seller of property. 
-
48. 
However, there are some differences between the estate agent and the 
conductor operis. A small point is that it is said that the normal object 
of contracts of locatio conductio operis is work on a physical subject-
matter whilst the rendition of services of a professional nature is usually 
31 governed by the contract of mandate. A more significant difference 
relates to the duty to complete the task. The independent contractor 
is obliged to make performance in terms of the contract, and can be 
compelled to do so by the locator operis. The estate agent obviously 
cannot be compelled to 'find a buyer', but more importantly he cannot 
be compelled to attempt to do so. The estate agent has no duty even 
to begin to undertake the task entrusted to him. 32 So, whilst it is 
fair to say that an estate agent is somewhat akin to an independent 
contractor, the distinguishing factors place him quite outside that 
category of legal persona. 
c) Mandatary 
It is an unchallenged notion that the contract which governs the 
relationship between estate agent and his principal is one of mandate. 
It might therefore seem an obvious conclusion that an estate agent 
must be a mandatary. One might even wonder at the need to enquire 
whether or not the estate agent is an agent proper or independent 
contractor or servant. Yet the fit is not all that snug. For, like the 
conductor operis, the mandatary has an exigible duty to execute the 
33 task mandated, whereas the estate agent merely has an opportunity, 
not a duty, to perform. On this basis, the estate agent, strictly speaking, 
34 cannot be a mandatary. However, as will be seen later, it is probable 
that the estate agent is a variant of the mandatary. 
49. 
d) Broker 
In the United States of America, estate agents are referred to as 'real 
estate brokers'. Could the estate agent be regarded as a broker in 
South African law? Many of the early cases on estate agency refer 
to the commission agent as a broker. 
In case law, a broker has been defined as a 'middleman or intermediary 
whose office it is to negotiate between two parties until they are at 
one as regards the terms upon which they are prepared to buy and 
sell'. 35 He is an 'intermediary rather than a business plenipotentiary'. 36 
Voet describes a broker as a 'go-between' or 'intermediary', who 'bestows 
his services with a view to putting through some business between two 
37 or more persons'. These descriptions apply perfectly to an estate 
agent. Moreover, a broker is usually remunerated by commission, which 
he earns if he was the efficient cause of the conclusion of the contract. 
If no contract is concluded, the broker will generally not earn any 
commission. So he will usually have no claim, despite his efforts, if 
his principal refuses to sell, sells privately, or sells through another 
broker. 38 In all of these respects, the broker is identical to the estate 
39 agent. The broker and the estate agent also have this in common: 
they have a fairly similar independence from their so-called principals, 
quite unlike the usual agent or mandatary who has an exigible duty 
to complete the task mandated and the concomitant right to demand 
payment for his efforts. 
Of course, there is one real difference between a broker and an estate 
agent, namely, that, in practice brokers such as woolbrokers and stock-
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brokers frequ~ntly conclude contracts themselves on behalf of their 
principals. However, it should be noted that, in legal terms, it seems 
that it is not necessary that a broker be possessed of, or use, a power 
to conclude juristic acts on behalf of his principal. A broker can be 
a mere 'unempowered' intermediary, although admittedly this is rare 
in practice. 
It is submitted that a number of advantages would be realised in treating 
the estate agent as a broker. 40 However, the law is so steeped in 
its current attitude· towards estate agents that this notion is unlikely 
to gain any acceptance whatever. 
e) Unempowered Independent Agents 
This category is a proposal of Professor Kerr. 41 It is not yet a 
recognised category in South African law. The distinguishing feature 
of such agents is that they do not have a duty, but merely an opportunity 
to perform the task entrusted to them. This would seem to be an ideal 
niche for the estate agent. Kerr cites as support for this new category 
the case of Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd v Macdonald 
42 
This case concerned the delictual liability of an insurance agent, whose 
'\ 
task was to obtain proposals for assurance for the society, collect the 
premiums, and have the proponents medically examined. Both De Villiers 
CJ 43 and Wessels JA 44 remarked that the insurance agent had no duty 
at all to obtain or even to 1ttempt to obtain any proposals. He merely 
had an opportunity to earn his commission by executing the task, if 
he wished. Kerr suggests that the insurance agent in this case should 
51. 
\ 
be known as an unempowered independent agent. One strongly suspects 
that this is an 'other' category which has been invented to group together 
otherwise unclassifiable legal personae. However, it is true that ·the 
estate agent would fit perfectly well into this category, as would any 
other commission agents who earn their commission upon completion 
of a task which they were under no duty to undertake. It is submitted, 
though, that this category is unlikely to find general acceptance in South 
African law. It conveys too little information about its constituent 
members, whereas South African law already has well developed 
categories, such as the independent contractor, the mandatary, or the 
broker to which this type of commission agent could and should belong, 
because of the extensive community of characteristics that he shares 
with members of these categories. · The one striking dissimilarity, the 
lack of a duty to complete the task mandated, is insufficient reason 
f t . . . t . t k" d of legal 11·mbo.45 or cas mg comm1ss10n agen s 1n o a In 
Summary 
In South African law, there is theoretically no overlap between the 
three categories of mandatary, independent contractor and servant. 
However, at times, as Kahn remarks, 46 the distinction may be difficult 
to draw, particularly as regards the mandatary vis-a-vis the independent 
contractor. 
Although the estate agent, strictly speaking, falls into neither of these 
two categories, he is akin to both, and despite some of the attractions 
of regarding him as a broker he will almost · certainly continue to be 
52. 
regarded in South African law either as an odd type of mandatary or 
as an independent contractor. But of which category is he a mutation?47 
V/hilst the estate agent enjoys an independence similar to that of the 
conductor operis as to the manner and time within which he is to 
perform his task, this similarity flows purely from the quirk that the 
estate agent is under no obligation to do anything at all, and it is 
submitted that this is insufficient to categorise the estate agent as 
a conductor operis. There are some pointers which, it is submitted, 
firmly distinguish the estate agent as a mandatary rather than a 
conductor operis. First, there is the small point that the type of task 
usually undertaken by the mandatary is more of a professional nature. 
48 
The fact that the estate agent is paid by commission is also an indicium 
49 that he is a mandatary. finally, there is a distinction in the quality 
of the relationship that the mandatary enjoys a propos the mandator, 
when compared to the conductor and locator operis. The latter relation-
50 
ship is clearly on a more 'arms-length' basis than the former. Although 
there is little authority on the subject, there can be little doubt that 
the fiduciary duties of the mandatary, most of whi_ch apply to the estate 
agent, are significantly greater than those of the conductor operis. 
51 
To conclude on this point: The estate agent's contract with his principal 
is sui generis. 52 The estate agent is not, legally, an agent; in all 
respects but one, he resembles a mandatary, and should be treated as 
such. 
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4. DOES THE STANDARD FORM DEED OF SALE CREATE RIGHTS FOR 
THE ESTATE AGENT? 
Having eliminated what the estate agent is not, and having, in this 
manner, arrived at the conclusion that he most closely resembles a 
mandatary, one might have expected the estate agent's cause of action 
in a claim for commission to be founded squarely on the fulfilment 
of his mandate. However, difficulties that have sometimes been 
experienced in proving the mandate (especially when oral) have led estate _ 
agents to try to establish other legal bases for the recovery of their 
commissions. The deea of sale, memorialising the contract between the 
seller and the purchaser, usually contains a clause to the following effect: 
'The seller undertakes to pay ABC Estate Agency commission at 
the rate of 
Such a promise has provided a convenient platform for the contentions 
that: 
i) The promise embodied in the clause is a contract for the benefit 
of a third person - the estate agent - whose acceptance of this 
benefit founds his right to sue the seller for commission; or 
ii) The deed of sale, whilst it principally embodies a contract between 
purchaser and seller, also contains, by virtue of the seller's promise 
to pay the estate agent, a contract directly between the seller 
and the estate agent. 
4.1 
54. 
Furthermore, these days, the deed of sale often contains another clause 
in terms of which the purchaser promises to pay the agent's commission 
(or liquidated damages), should he fail to fulfil his obligations under 
the contract with the seller. Arguably such a promise may also constitute 
a contract, on this occasion between the purchaser and the agent. 
These contentions have received a certain degree of sanction by the 
courts. That being the case they bear closer examination. 
Estate Agent as a Third Party Beneficiary Under a Stipulatio Alteri 
The original source of the idea that the deed of sale embodies a 
stipulatio alteri is obscure, but it may possibly be one of the very early 
d · · h · , . h . . 53 ec1s10ns on t e auct10neer s ng t to comm1ss10n. Al though no court 
has ever crisply decided the issue, 54 several cases obliquely suggest 
that the seller's promise. to pay the estate agent's commission is a 
55 
contract for the benefit of a third party, namely the estate agent. 
·. 56 
Moreover, counsel frequently plead such cases as stipulationes alten, 
and, in fact, the idea has taken such a firm hold that, these days, 
several estate agents have actually taken the precaution of having a 
clause inserted at the end of the deed of sale, in terms of which they 
purport to accept the benefits conferred on them by the agreement. 
Is this development sound? Consider the stipulatio alteri. Very briefly, 
it has the following salient features: It is a contract between A (the 
promittens) and B (the stipulans) in terms of which A promises B that 
he will confer a benefit on T (a third party). A and B bind themselves 
55. 
as principals, and not as agents, or representatives of T. According 
to judicial precedent, until T accepts the benefit of the stipulation made 
in his favour, he acquires no rights under the contract, and B may release 
57 
A, or~ B and A acting together may cancel the contract. On accept-
ance of the benefit by T, he becomes a party to the contract, and 
58 may thenceforth sue in his own name for performance. B then falls 
out of the contract. 59 
So, in casu, the contention is that the purchaser is a stipulans, who 
is stipulating for the benefit of a third party, the estate agent, by oblig-
ing the seller, the promittens, to promise to pay the estate agent his 
commission. This may seem fanciful, but it is certainly true that the 
legal nature of a stipulatio alteri is sufficiently elastic to accommodate 
disparate commercial transactions. Indeed this is its main attraction. 
Although there is a good deal of academic controversy regarding the 
f · 1 · 1 · 
60 h t h d t d proper legal nature o a st1pu at10 a ten, t e cour s ave a op e a 
tranquil approach. They have simply developed the law along the. lines 
of the contractual concept of off er 
are some logical inconsistencies in 
61 and acceptance. Although there 
62 such as approach the judicial 
precedents are now so well entrenched, that it is a reasonably safe 
assumption that the existing rules will, by and large, remain unaltered. 
One of these rules provides the principal objection to the idea that 
the seller's promises to pay the estate agent can be- properly construed 
as a stipulatio alteri. That rule concerns the intention of the principals 
to the transaction, A and B. It is settled law that the fact that a 
56. 
third party would derive certain benefits from the carrying out of a 
contract does not necessarily mean that it was intended that the third 
party could, by adoption, become a party to the contract. 63 It is 
essential that the stipulans and promittens should have contracted with 
each other with the intention of conferring an enforceable right of action 
64 on the third party. 
The rule is well i.llustrated by Robert Baikie v Pretoria Municipality. 
65 
In this case, land was sold by public auction. One of the terms of 
the sale was that the purchaser should pay auctioneer's commission, 
plus arrear rates and taxes. Pretoria municipality sued B, the purchaser, 
for arrear rates, alleging that the contract of sale contained a stipulation 
for the benefit of a third party which had been accepted by the 
municipality. This argument failed. The Court observed that there 
was no motive for the seller to stipulate for the . benefit of the 
municipality, but every motive to stipulate in his own interest for the 
d. h f d b h. h h d I I bl" · 66 1sc arge o a e t w 1c e was un er a ega o 1gat10n to pay. 
Stratford J held. that the municipality was a mere adjectus solutionis 
67 causa. 
In the case of the deed of sale, it is surely clear that what the pur-
chaser and seller truly intend is to conclude a bargain between them-
selves. It is risible to suggest that the purchaser, who usually has merely 
the slightest commercial acquaintance with the estate agent, has the 
intention, when he signs the deed of sale, of stipulating for the benefit 
of the agent. In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that the super-




misleading. An attempt to accommodate the estate agent by stretching 
the concept of the stipulatio alteri in this fashion is artificial and 
inelegant; moreover, it is quite unnecessary, since the agent's 'mandate' 
provides a perfectly sound and logically clear foundation for the recovery 
of his commission. 
Estate Agent as a Direct Party to Other Contracts Embodied in the 
Deed of Sale 
Contract Between Estate Agent and Seller · 
The idea that the deed of sale also contains a contract directly between 
the seller and the estate agent originated from the Appellate Division 
decision in Baker v Afrikaanse Nasionale Af slaers en Agentskap 
Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk. 68 In this case, the estate agent had prepared 
a written offer to purchase, which had been signed by the purchaser. 
On the back of this document, there was a separate clause which read: 
'Ek neem die aanbod deur die koper ••• aan en beskou aldus hierdie 
as 'n bindende koop waarby die ••• Maatskappy hulle opdrag om 
te verkoop uitgevoer het en hulle geregtig is op verkoopskommissie 
van £ 115, en ek verleen hulle hiermee die reg om dit te neem uit 
die eerste betaling deur koper gemaak.' 
The seller appended his signature under this clause. Was the seller 
merely accepting the purchaser's offer, the reference to estate agent's 
commission being a determination of their rights and duties inter se 
by the purchaser and seller, or was the seller making a contract directly 
58. 
with the estate agent _as well as with the purchaser? The small difficulty 
that the document had not been signed by the estate agent who was 
thus apparently not a party to the written agreement was easily over-
come.69The Court held that the particular wording of the clause indicated 
that the seller was not reaching agreement with the buyer as to which 
of them should pay the estate agent's commission, but rather that the 
70 seller was binding himself to the estate agent. 
The next case on the point was Van Heerden v Hermann. 71 Again, 
in this case,. the deed of sale had been signed by the purchaser and 
by the seller, but not by the estate agent. The reference to the pay-
ment by the seller of the estate agent's commission was contained, 
not in the acceptance, but in the written offer by the purchaser. It 
was held that this could make no difference72 and the decision in Baker's 
case was followed. 
In each of these cases there were two contracts in one document. 
Baker's case has, unsurprisingly, been re-affirmed in the Appellate 
D. · · 
73 d h h b b f h' h h f II d 1v1s10n an t ere as een a num er o cases w 1c ave o owe 
h d 
. . 74 t ese two ec1s10n s. 
In none of these cases has there arisen the issue of the estate agent's 
mandate or the issue whether or not he was the efficient cause of the 
sale. It is the seller's promise._; to pay which has founded the estate 
I f . 75 agent s cause o act10n. Moreover, it is .clear that such a promise 
f f h 
76 . dd' . . h creates a new cause o action or t e agent, m a 1t10n to any ng ts 
that he may have in terms of a contract of mandate with the seller. 
77 
59. 
However, the creation of a new obligation in this way postulates a new 
agreement. ls there consensus in this regard between the seller and 
the estate agent? The fact that the estate agent has not signed the 
deed of sale is, as we have seen in Baker's case, 78 not a problem, but 
does the seller have the necessary animus contrahendi? 
ordinarily intend to create additional rights for the. estate agent? 
Does he 
The answer naturally depends on the facts of each case, but the presence 
of such animus would seem to be doubtful in the instance of the typical 
standard form deed of sale. This document is usually printed on the 
estate agent's stationery, and is headed 'Offer to Purchase and Deed 
of Sale'. As we have seen, the Court in Van Heerden v Hermann 79 
decided that it could make no difference that the clause providing for ., 
payment of the agent's commission was contained in the written offer 
made by the purchaser, rather than in a specially formulated acceptance 
clause signed by the seller. With respect, it is submitted that in many 
cases this fact does make a difference. The written offer records the 
terms on which the purchaser is prepared to purchase the property. 
When it is stipulated in that off er that the seller undertakes to pay 
the agent, surely the inference is strong that it is the purchaser who 
is stipulating, as a term of any future contract, that he, the purchaser, 
should not have to pay the estate agent? When the seller accepts the 
purchaser's offer by signing the self-same document, is it not inherently 
more probable that he is accepting this obligation vis-a-vis the purchaser 
only, and not vis-a-vis the estate agent, with whom he usually has a 
separate contractual relationship, established some time previously? 
60. 
Indeed, it would be a little surprising if the estate agent's commission 
were not mentioned in the deed of sale. It is an important clause. 
It is common sense that the seller and purchaser should regulate this 
matter between themselves. 80 
Caveat subscriptor may provide a swift rejoinder to the above argument. 
In other words, whatever the sellers subjective intentions, by appending 
his signature to a clearly worded undertaking to pay the agent, he must 
be taken to have intended to contract with the agent, and so to have 
created a new obligation. Can the seller avoid the application of the 
caveat subscriptor maxim? 81 The scope for a defence of unilateral 
. k d b l 82 b d · · 83 m1sta e use to e extreme y narrow, ut two recent ec1s1ons 
have made it clear that, in appropriate circumstances, a party who 
presents a document for signature may be under a duty to draw the 
signatory's attention to unusual or unexpected terms contained therein, 
so as to prevent the signatory from contracting on a mistaken basis. 
Failure to fulfil such a duty may amount to a passive misrepresentation. 
If the signatory's resultant error is material and reasonable, he will 
have a defence. 84 
One may employ the reasoning of the Appellate Division in Spindrifter85 
as follows: In many cases it is submitted, the estate agent has no 
'reason to believe186 that the seller has the intention, when he signs 
the deed of sale, to create a new obligation in the agent's favour. 
Accordingly, in such cases, it is the agent's duty to point out that the 
document bears that potential. Failure to do so should allow the seller 
61. 
to plead that he had no 'reason to believe' that the document would 
. 87 
create a new (and more potent) cause of action for the agent and that 
he signed the document under the reasonably mis.taken belief that it 
dealt merely with his relationship with the purchaser, or that it merely 
confirmed a · prior arrangement with the agent. 88 
Therefore, although there can scarcely be any quarrel with a case such 
as Baker, it is submitted that it should not be too readily assumed that 
the common undertaking to pay commission found in the standard form 
'Offer to Purchase and Deed of Sale' constitutes a binding contract 
between the seller and the estate agent. Of course, such a written 
undertaking is not valueless. It will usually afford the agent strong 
evidence of a prior contract (of 'mandate') between himself and the 
seller. 89 
4.2.2 Contract Between Estate Agent and Purchaser 
There are good reasons for the insertion in the deed of sale of a clause 
requiring the purchaser to pay the estate agent should the purchaser 
fail to fulfil his obligations under his contract with the seller. It is 
convenient for the seller since there are circumstances where, even if 
it is the purchaser who unlawfully resiles from a binding contract of 
sale, the seller remains liable for the agent's commission. 90 To obviate 
the vexation of the seller's having to sue the purchaser to recover this 
expense, it is clearly more convenient for the estate agent to have 
the rfght to claim his commission directly from the purchaser. More 
62. 
importantly, the clause benefits the estate agent as it closes a loophole 
through which his right to commission might otherwise slip: Where 
the event which entitles the estate agent to commission is the conclusion 
91 of a binding and enforceable sale and the purchaser unlawfully resiles 
92 after the conclusion of a sale which is binding, but not yet enforceable, 
then the agent obviously cannot sue the seller. His only hope of recover-
ing his commission, therefore, is to sue the purchaser. However in 
the absence of a vinculum iuris a contractual action is out of the 
question. This loophole is closed by the 'penalty' clause, which 'is an 
attempt by the estate agent to create a cause of action in contract 
against the purchaser. The question is: Does the 'penalty' clause 
succeed in constituting an enforceable contract between the agent and 
the purchaser? 
In Phillips v Aida Real Estate, 93 the standard form document used by 
Aida Real Estate contained the abovementioned 'penalty' clause, and 
in addition, a clause which stated that should the purchaser withdraw 
his off er before acceptance by the seller, he agreed to pay the estate 
agent liquidated damages in the amount of the commission. As matters 
transpired, the purchaser did withdraw his offer. The issue was whether 
his promise to pay liquidated damages, as contained , in the document, 
constituted a separate contract with the agent. The Court held that 
unlike Baker's case and George Ruggier's case, this was not a case 
in which it had been intended by all concerned that, in addition to the 
contract between the seller and the purchaser, the signer of the 
94 document was also contracting with the estate agent. 
63. 
95 
It has been remarked by Professor Tager that the Court took an 
extremely subjective view of the matter, which was fortunate for the 
purchaser because in the past, the courts have frequently held parties 
to be bound by a contract purely because there was an objective appear-
ance of their having had an intention to be bound. 96 Moreover, it is 
clear that the decision was based on certain extraordinary facts. 97 
The Appellate Division was clearly of the opinion that, in principle, 
a purchaser, who signs a deed of sale incorporating such a promise to 
pay the estate agent, will generally be bound to the estate agent as 
a result. 98 
It seems therefore, that despite the actual outcome of the case in Aida, 
a purchaser who signs a deed which contains such a 'penalty' clause 
will generally be held to have contracted with the estate agent. 
Certainly there is less scope for avoiding the application of the caveat 
subscriptor maxim. The standard form 'Offer to Purchase and Deed 
of Sale' purports to be a document stating the purchaser's own terms 
of purchase. Moreover, the purchaser cannot contend that he mistakenly 
thought that he was merely confirming a prior arrangement with the 
agent, for there is usually no prior legal relationship between the parties. 
Provided he reads the 'penalty' clause, it is submitted that there is 
little room for the purchaser to argue that he had no 'reason to believe' 
that he had agreed to the creation of a binding (contingent) obligation 
99 in favour of the estate agent. 
64. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The estate agent is normal_ly not an agent, in the strict sense of that 
term, because he usually l~cks the power to create, alter or extinguish 
legal relationships for his principal. Since he has no exigible duty to 
complete the task entrusted to him, he is also, strictly speaking not 
a mandatary. Although he closely resembles a mandatary, his contract 
with his principal is in fact sui generis. 
The estate agent may be able, in appropriate cases, to recover his 
commission by relying, not on his 'mandate', but on an explicit under-
taking in the deed of sale by the seller to pay the commission. However, 
it is submitted that the analysis of such an undertaking as a contract 
for the benefit of the estate agent is ill-founded. The purchaser can 
hardly be accurately cast as a stipulans whose intention it is, when 
signing the document, to stipulate . for the benefit of the agent. The 
better view, that the undertaking is a direct contract between the agent 
and the seller, is also contestable in certain circumstances. Frequently, 
the seller will lack the necessary animus contrahendi, especially as 
regards the creation of a new obligation. He will of ten regard his 
promise to pay the agent as merely confirming a prior agreement, or, 
bearing in mind that the promise first appears in a document stating 
the terms of the purchaser's offer, he may reasonably believe that he 
and the purchaser are simply regulating the matter of agent's commission 
inter se. 
65. 
By contrast, the purchaser, who usually has no previous legal relationship 
with the agent, will generally struggle to overcome the prima facie 
impression th-at his promise to pay the agent, in the event of his default, 
creates a binding legal obligation. 
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'The law of agency does not allow of a brief definition, simply because 
we cannot compress the whole law into a sentence that is both short 
and significant' (S J Stoljar The Law of Agency, Its History and Present 
Principles ( 1961) 1) - a remark with which G H L Fridman The Law 
of Agency (5 ed 1983) 9 agrees. 
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agency power made by W A Seavey 'The Rationale of Agency' ( 1920) 
29 Yale LJ 859 at 861. 
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third parties". In Bowstead on Agency ( 14 ed 1976 Article 1) the element 
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power. Bowstead says agency is the relationship which exists between 
two persons, one of whom expressly or impliedly consents that the other 
should represent him or act on his behalf, and the other of whom similarly 
consents, to represent the former or so to act. The Restatement of 
the Law of Agency (American Law Institute 2 ed 1958 para 1) lays similar 
67. 
stress on the aspect of consent. De Villiers and Macintosh The Law 
of Agency in South Africa (3 ed 1981 by J M Silke) forbear to define 
the concept of agency. Wisely they separately define an agent (at 38) 
and the contract of agency (at 42). It is clear, even from the text, 
that the latter is a misnomer. What is being defined is clearly a contract 
of mandate. / 
10. See J T R Gibson South African Mercantile and Company Law (5 ed 1983) 
en.apter 7; Wilie's Principles of South African Law (7 ed by J T R Gibson 
1977) chapter 34; Lee and Honore Law of Obligations (2 ed edited by 
E Newman and D J McQuoid-Mason 1978) chapter 14; Wille and Millin's 
Mercantile Law of South Africa (18 ed by J f' Coaker and D T Zeffertt 
1984) chapter 8; A J Kerr The Law of Agency (2 ed 1979) chapter 1; 
De Villiers and Macintosh op cit note 9 articles 1 and 2. Of course, 
it is recognised that not all acts of agency arise out of appointment by 
contract (eg agency of necessity, agency by estoppel, and agency by 
ratification._- See f E Dowrick 'The Relationship of Principal and Agent' 
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11. See De Wet en Yeat_s Kontraktereg en Handelsreg (4 ed 1978 by J C de 
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of one person concluding a juristic act on behalf of another, the result 
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to two juristic concepts, distinct from each other. 
12. De Wet says that as a matter of fact, it frequently happens that the 
act of authorisation coincides with the establishment of a contractual 
relationship between principal and agent, and it may even be inferred 
from the existence of this contractual relationship, but this is a mere 
practical matter. In principle, the mechanism for the creation of the 
agency power is a juristic act distinct from the contract between principal 
and agent. De Wet's views, whil:,t somewhat revolutionary in the South 
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the act of authorisation and the mandate or contract between principal 
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legal science. 
Ihering was an early pioneer when he wrote: 
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Freienf els 'Legal Relations in the Law of Agency: Power of Agency 
and Commercial Certainty' ( 1964) 1°3 American Journal of Comparative 
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Freienf els op cit at 199). 
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Interestingly, the American Restatement (op cit note 9 para 220 (1) ) 
classifies all agents as either servants or independent contractors. Powell 
(The Law of Agency ( 1961) 9) is now of the same view, although English 
law in general does seem to support a threefold classification (Fridman 
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two which is the most popular approach nowadays. See De Villiers and 
Macintosh op cit note 9 at 16-26. 
28. Despite the fact that it is sometimes loosely remarked that in order to 
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at 433. 
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Ltd 1967 (2) SA 511 (D) at 517A-D. Kerr op cit note 31 at 326 is quite 
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1921 OPD 38. 
37. D 50 14 1. See also Voet 17 1 4. 
38. See De Villiers & Macintosh op cit note 9 at 224-238. 
71. 
39. In S v Vanmali 1975 (1) SA 17 (N) Fannin J, in distinguishing . an agent 
proper, spoke of an estate agent and broker in the same breath. See 
also Wessels J in Bird v Sumerville 1960 (4) SA 395 (N) at 410 - 'where 
an estate agent negotiates with a prospective purchaser in the sense of 
bringing his powers of persuasion to bear so as to convert him to a willing 
buyer, he is not really acting as an agent on behalf of his principal (the 
seller), but merely performing those services which he is required to perform 
in order to earn his commission'. See also Glass v A G Hendrie and Co 
(Pvt) Ltd 1957 (1) PH A6 (SR) where the intermediary in a sale of land 
was considered as a broker who was the agent of both buyer and seller. 
See also De Villiers and Macintosh op cit note 9 at 242-3. 
40. Such an approach would help to solve at least one vexed problem in the 
law of estate agency, namely, the vinculum iuris between the estate agent 
and the purchaser. It is said that the broker acts, as it were, for both 
parties. See Benoni Produce supra note 35 at 459 - 'It is no doubt true 
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Commentaries on the Law of Agency (1882 9 ed) section 30. The estate 
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shares. In other words, suppose all transfers of land were required to 
be transacted through a 'real estate broker'. In return for this monopoly, 
maximum commission rates, a good deal lower than current normal rates, 
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the aid of an estate agent. However, a seller who has himself found 
a buyer would have a very strong negotiating position vis-a-vis the estate 
agent. He would surely be able to negotiate a very low commission. 
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of good faith and of care) to his principal. 
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Meridiana 1 at 1-2. 
62. See, for example, Hutchison op cit note 61 at 6-7. 
63. J ankelow v Binder Gering and Co 1927 TPD 364 at 371. 
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the purchaser of land would pay the auctioneer's commission, was for 
the benefit of the auctioneer, who recovered his commission. Stratford 
J distinguished it on the grounds that at the time when the conditions 
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from its performance. However, in Baikie's case it was to the material 
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70. At 376O-H. 
71. 1953 (3) SA 180 (T). 
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75. It is trite that a promise to pay made seriously and deliberately and with 
the intention that a lawful obligation should be established, is binding 
and founds a good cause of action: Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 
at 288-9. 
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relates to the legal effect of his signature to the deed of sale. In George 
v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 455 (A), part of the appellant's case 
was that he had not meant to sign a contractual document. Fagan CJ 
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87. Ordinarily, an estate agent who claims his · commission bears the onus 
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being created. --
89. The conclusion that the deed of sale contains a contract between the 
estate agent and the seller may have a further drawback. It seems that 
the parol evidence rule may come into play. In Raker's case supra note 
68, it was held that evidence by the seller that his written promise to 
pay the estate agent should be modified by a verbal condition ('no payment, -
no commission') was ·inadmissible as such a prior oral agreement conflicted 
with the written memorial of the parties' transaction. Similarly, in Wann 
v Dollie supra note 74, the agent's counsel contended that evidence of 
a prior oral agreement and of a subsequent oral agreement, varying the 
terms of the initial oral agreement should not not be admitted as it 
off ended against the parol evidence rule. The Court did not have to decide 
this point. See also Jeffrey v Andries Zietsman (Edms) Bpk 1976 (2) SA 
870 (T) -at 873. 
It is submitted that the parol evidence rule is not a serious obstacle for 
the seller. It is settled law that the seller may lead evidence to show 
that the document is not a contract between himself and the estate agent: 
Beaton v Balachin Bros 1920 AD 312 at 315. This is, after all, his main 
object in these cases. If the seller fails in this respect it is submitted 
that he will usually still be able to lead evidence modifying the terms 
of his promise because it is also settled law that the rule only applies 
to documents which the parties have agreed are intended to embody all 
of the terms of their contract. The estate agent would be hard put, 
it is submitted, to contend that one brief sentence in a deed of sale 
78. 
encapsulated his entire commercial relationship with the seller. There 
is nothing to stop parties recording a part of their contract in wntmg 
and leaving the rest oral. See L H Hoffmann and D T Zeff ertt The South 
African Law of Evidence (3 ed 1981) 231-236. 
90. Where the event which entitles the estate agent to his comm1ss10n is 
the conclusion of a binding sale ( this is the norm - Brayshaw v Schoeman 
en Andere 1960 ( 1) SA 625 (A) ), then once such a sale has been concluded, 
the estate agent may recover his commission from the seller, even if 
the purchaser later resiles (provided he does not do so through an inability 
to pay which existed at the time the contract was concluded). See Levy 
v Phillips 1915 AD 139; Gluckman v Landau & Co 1944 TPD 261. 
91. l\1any contracts for the sale of land are made subject to the fulfilment 
of a suspensive condition that the purchaser is able to raise the necessary 
mortgage finance. It is open to the parties to specify that the agent 
shall not be entitled to his commission until the sale becomes enforceable. 
92. That is, before the time for the fulfilment of the condition has elapsed. 
93. Supra note 56. 
94. At 206f. 
95. L Tager 'The Estate Agent's Commission: Let the Purchaser Beware' 
( 1976) 93 SALJ 271 at 272. 
96. Nominally, the Court's decision was based on two grounds, but Tager supra 
note 95, believes that the second ground was the real basis on which the 
decision rested. This second ground concerned the omission by parties 
to insert the date of expiry of the off er which meant that the purchaser 
was entitled to withdraw his offer with impunity. 
97. Inter alia the estate agent presented the document to the purchaser for 
his signature whilst the purchaser was sitting in a barber's chair having 
his hair cut(!) The purchaser had no time to read the whole document. 
98. See the judgment at 207 in particular, and Tager's comments op cit note 
95 at 273. See also Jeffrey v Andries Zietsman supra note 89 at 872H 
and 873H. In Commercial Business Brokers v Hassen 1985 (3) SA 583 
(N), the purchaser failed in an action against an estate agent who :was 
held to be entitled to retain the commission he had deducted from the 
purchaser's deposit in .. terms of a clause in the deed of sale between the 
purchaser and the seller, even though, that contract ultimately fell away 
because of the failure of a suspensive condition. 
79. 
99. Of course, it is factually possible that the purchaser might mistakenly 
believe that the 'penalty' clause merely regulates matters between himself 
and the seller. However, the test in regard to iustus error is the objective 
test of a reasonable man: Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics 
(Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 537 (W). It is submitted that, generally, a purchaser 
who has read the 'penalty' clause will struggle to satisfy such a test 
in relation to his mistaken belief. 
TREATISE III 
CONDUCT BY THE SELLER WHICH PREVENTS THE ESTATE AGENT FROM 
EARNING HIS COMMISSION 
1. 'INTRODUCTION 
80. 
An estate agent is usually instructed by the seller of a property. 
This paper deals with the right of action of the estate agent when 
the conduct- -of- the seller deprives the agent of the opportunity 
to earn his commission. Such conduct may occur before or after 
the agent has found a suitable purchaser. In either case, it 
prevents the occurrence of the event which would have entitled the 
agent to claim his commission. Such prevention may in fact be law-
ful. Where it is unlawful, the estate agent's usual remedy is a 
claim, not for commission, but for damages for breach of mandate. 
However, exceptionally, in appropriate circumstances, the agent 
may have an action for his full commission on the basis of the 
doctrine of fictional fulfilment. The question whether the seller's 
conduct amounts to a breach of his promise to the agent can be 
addressed more lucidly after a prior examination of the nature of 
the seller's promise. 
2. THE NATURE OF THE SELLER'S PROMISE TO THE AGENT 
The common mandate of the estate agent • is to 'find a purchaser' • 
Obviously, the estate agent is under no obligation to fulfil this 
mandate. It may prove impossible to do so. Moreover, it is settled 




His contract with the seller is therefore not one involving mutual 
promises to perform. It has been held that the contract between 
the seller and the estate agent is merely a promise binding on the 
seller to pay a sum of money upon the happening of a specified event, 
which involves the rendering of some service by the agent. 2 A number 
of observations may be made. 
First, it has been noted that the seller pays not for a service, 
3 but for a result. The courts have consistently held that the mere 
introduction of a person who is willing and able to purchase, whilst 
it may be all that the agent can effectively achieve, is normally 
insufficient to entitle him to commission. 4 It is said that the 
common intention of the parties generally envisages that the agent 
will be entitled to his commission only when a further event occurs 
- usually the conclusion of a binding sale. 5 Clearly then, the 
seller's promise to pay is subject to the suspensive condition that 
such further event occurs. Note that the occurrence of the agreed 
event is utterly outside the control of the agent, as he usually 
plays no material part in the actual conclusion of the contract 
6 between purchaser and seller. It would seem, therefore, that a 
juridical distinction exists between an agent's performance of his 
mandate and his right to commission.
7 
Secondly, it is clear that the agent need not actually 'introduce' 
a purchaser in the ordinary sense of that word. 8 What is required 
is that the efforts of the agent should be the 'efficient cause' 
of the conclusion of the sale. 9 Of course, 10 often (but not 
82. 
always11 ) it is precisely the initial introduction of a suitable 
purchaser by the agent which is held to be the 'efficient cause' 
of the sale. 
One concludes that, as a general proposition, 12 the seller's promise 
is to pay the estate agent a commission if the efforts of the agent 
are the efficient cause of the seller's concluding a binding sale. 13 
Clearly, however, the parties may, in a particular case, agree other-
wise.14 For example, they may agree that -the agent's right to 
commission should depend on the sale's being not merely binding, 
15 but also enforceable. Or they may agree that it should depend 
on payment by the purchaser of the purchase price, 16 or even that 
it should not depend on any further event, eg the estate agent should 
be entitled to his commission upon the mere introduction of a person 
willing and able to purchase. 17 A wide variety of agreements as 
to when the agent's right to commission should accrue, are factually 
'bl 18 poSSl e. 
3. THE LAWFULNESS OF CONDUCT BY THE SELLER WHICH INTERVENES TO PREVENT 
THE AGENT FROM EARNING HIS COMMISSION 
Whatever event the parties agree upon as the event which entitles 
the estate agent to commission, that is the event which suspends 
the seller's promise to pay. It is only upon the suspensive condi-
tion being fulfilled as a result of the agent's efforts that his 
right to commission accrues. 
83. 
However, the seller's conduct may intercede in various ways with 
the effect of preventing the suspensive condition from being ful-
filled. For example, the seller may change his mind and refuse 
to sell to the proposed purchaser found by the agent, or, if the 
agent has not yet found a purchaser, the seller may change his mind, 
and refuse to sell at all. To this end, he may seek to revoke the 
agent Is mandate. The seller may wish to sell his property through 
another agent, or to a purchaser he has himself found. It will 
be shown that, in general, such conduct is lawful. However, a 
specific term of the mandate may limit the seller's right so to 
conduct himself, eg the conferment of a sole agency. Where the 
seller's conduct is· unlawful, the agent may normally claim damages 
for breach of mandate, but not his commission.
19 
However, in limited 
circumstances, the agent may be able to claim his full commission 
on the basis of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment. 
3.1 Fictional Fulfilment 
The Appellate Division has stated the doctrine of fictional fulfil-
ment as follows: 
a condition is deemed to have been fulfilled as against 
a person who would, subject to its fulfilment, be bound by 
an obligation, and who has designedly
2
0 prevented its fulfil-
ment, unless the nature of the contract or the circumstances 
show the absence of dolus on his part!
21 
84. 
The meaning of dolus in this context is somewhat obscure.
22 
However, 
it is at least clear that the term is not confined to the narrow 
sense of fraud or want of good faith. It is used in its 'widest 
23 sense'. It is submitted, though, that even allowing for usage 
in such a sense, the term dolus is not a particularly useful guide, 
at least in cases of estate agency. For example, where the event 
which suspends the seller's promise to pay is the usual one, namely 
the conclusion of a binding contract of sale, the doctrine of 
24 
fictional fulfilment has little role to play. So, it is clear 
from the case law that even if an entirely suitable purchaser has 
been introduced, and the seller designedly (and even in bad •faith .. , 
towards the estate agent) prevents fulfilment of the condition by 
refusing to sell, the estate agent will generally not be able to 
invoke the doctrine of fictional fulfilment. 25 
On the other hand, where the agreement between the agent and the 
11 · 
26 h h 1 ' f b. d. se er requires more tan t e mere cone usion o a in ing contrac4 
the agent may rely on fictional fulfilment in two typical instances
27
: 
a) Suppose that the event which entitles the agent to his 
commission is the conclusion of a binding· and enforceable 
sale. Further, suppose that a binding contract has been 
concluded between the seller and the purchaser which is not 
yet enforceable because it is subject to an unfulfilled 
suspensive condition. The seller unlawfully resiles from 
the binding contract before the time for fulfilment of this 
condition has elapsed. 
85. 
b) Suppose that the event which entitles the agent to his 
commission is the payment of the full purchase price by the 
purchaser. Suppose a binding contract has been concluded 
between purchaser and seller. The seller unlawfully resiles 
before payment of the purchaser price. 
It is submitted that in both of these instances, the agent will 
normally be able to recover his full commission.
28 
What then determines the success of a claim based on fictional 
fulfilment? De Wet and Yeats offer a convincing alternative to 
29 
the concept of dolus, which, it is submitted, is not truly the 
differentiating factor. The learned authors explain that the mere 
fact that the conduct of one of the parties intentionally prevents 
fulfilment of the condition does not necessarily bring the doctrine 
into operation. Sometimes the parties expect that one of them may 
so conduct himself. A condition should be regarded as fictionally 
fulfilled only if the debtor prevents fulfilment in a manner contrary 
h • I • • 30 to t e parties intentions. So, as is mentioned above, although 
the seller may well act dolo in refusing to sell his property, a 
claim against him based on fictional fulfilment will fail because 
it is usually the common intention of the parties that the seller 
has the right to refuse to sell for whatever reason. Where, however, 
the seller has, as it were, sanctioned the efforts of the agent 
by concluding a binding sale, it is usually commonly envisaged that, 
from that moment, the seller should do nothing to cause the condition 
(of his promise to pay) to fail. If he does so by unlawfully 
86. 
resiling from the binding sale, or even by reaching an agreement 
31 
with the purchaser to rescind the contract, the estate agent will 
be able to claim his full commission. Of course, if it is the 
purchaser who unlawfully resiles, 
32 
or if the condition to which 
the sale is subject fails naturally, no question of fictional fulfil-
ment arises. 
3.2 Seller's Refusal to Sell 
The point has already been made that it is usually the intention 
of the parties that the seller shall have an unfettered choice 
33 
whether or not to sell. In fact, it is arguable that the seller's 
right in this respect is a naturalium of many contracts between 
34 
estate agents and sellers of property. 
Of course, the parties may agree, tacitly or expressly, that the 
seller is not entitled to be capricious in this regard; that his 
refusal to sell will be unlawful, and will justify invocation of 
the doctrine of fictional fulfilment, unless the refusal is made 
with just or reasonable excuse. The difficulties of persuading 
a court that such an agreement has been reached are evident in the 
35 
seminal English case of Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper. 
Theoretically, the parties may go further, and agree that any refusal 
to sell by the seller shall be unlawful. In substance, such an 
agreement has the same effect as one where the parties have agreed 
that the mere introduction of a suitable purchaser is the event 
87. 
which entitles the estate agent to commission. In such a case, 
once the agent has introduced such a purchaser, his right to 
commission accrues. The issue of the lawfulness of any refusal 
by the seller to sell does not arise. 
Note that the grant of a sole agency or sole selling rights does 
not, as a rule, affect the seller's right to refuse to sel1. 36 
3.3 Seller Himself Finds a Purchaser 
It is settled law that, as a general rule, a seller who employs 
an estate agent to find a purchaser is none the less entitled to 
sell his property directly to - a purchaser found by himself. He 
may do so even after a proper offer has been submitted to him by 
the purchaser introduced by the agent, 
37 
unless of course it has 
been specifically agreed otherwise, eg where the parties have agreed 
that the mere introduction of a suitable purchaser will entitle 
the agent to his commission. 
The only difficulty in this regard relates to the issue of sole 
agency. In such a case, the exact wording of the mandate is crucial. 
It is settled that the mere conferment of a 'sole agency' does not 
per se preclude the seller from finding a purchaser himself. In 




However, there is an argument by certain writers39 that if the seller 
gives to the estate agent the 'sole right to sell' or 'sole selling 
rights', he relinquishes the right to sell to a purchaser that 
he has himself found in the sense that if he does so, he commits 
a breach of mandate, and will be liable in damages to the agent. 
The limited case law that exists tends to support this conclusion. 
In Nel v Grobbelaar & Viljoen Agentskappe (Edms) Bpk40 the relevant 
part of the agent's mandate was -
vHierdie opdrag (om die eiendom te verkoop) ••• verleen beslis 
die alleenreg aan die 
te verkoop.' 
eiendomsagentskap om die eiendom 
By the time the agent had found a purchaser, the seller had himself 
already sold the property. It is submitted that the seller, having 
given the sole right to sell to the agent, had committed a breach 
of mandate. However the estate agent failed to recover. Brink 
J was unpersuaded that the parties intended that the seller would 
be liable to the agent should he sell his property himself. It 
was Lichtenberg J who crisply considered the difference between 
the terms alleenreg ('sole right ( to sell)'') and alleenagentskap 
('sole agency'). The learned judge held that, while the seller 
could not be compelled to sell his property, if he did sell it to 
a purchaser he himself had found, he might well be liable in damages 
41 for breach of mandate. However, as the estate agent had claimed 
his commission, not damages, he was not entitled to succeed. 
3.4 
89. 
Further support for the academic view is found indirectly in a recent 
Appellate Division decision, 
42 
so there would appear to be little 
doubt that the seller's conduct, in these circumstances, is unlawful. 
Seller Sells Through Another Agent 
Although it is true that, in terms of the ordinary contract between 
the estate agent and the seller, the agent has no duty even to begin 
to undertake the task of finding a 
43 purchaser, there exists a 
counterweight in that the seller is not constrained to rely on one 
agent - he may employ as many agents as he likes, and yet, generally, 
he will pay just one commission to the agent who was the efficient 
cause of the agreed event, such as the conclusion of a binding sale. 
The other agents will not recover their expenses (if any), and their 
mandates will, at this stage, terminate automatically, probably 
by reason of an implied term to that effect. 
Contrast the position of sole agency. It is regarded as trite that 
if during the currency of a sole agency, the seller employs, and 
sells his property through, another estate agent, he commits a breach 
44 
of mandate vis-a-vis the sole agent, and will be liable in damages. 
However, it is frequently the case that the seller embarks on such 
a course out of frustration or dissatisfaction with the sole agent. 
The normal rule that the estate agent has no duty to begin to under-
take the task entrusted to him, seems out of place, given the fetter 
of sole agency. Is there any scope for the contention that the 
sole agent has an exigible obligation to take 'reasonable steps' 
90. 
45 
or to use his 'best endeavours' to find a purchaser? There is 
no South African precedent on this point but in England, Goddard 
46 
CJ has remarked that when the seller employs a sole agent, it 
must be on the understanding that the agent will do his best to 
find a purchaser, and will be committing a breach of his contract 
if he does not do his best, even though his search might prove 
47 
unsuccessful. Otherwise the seller obtains no benefit by the 
appointment of the sole agent. 
48 
Were such an obligation to be recognised in South African law, its 
source would almost invariably be an implied term of the contract. 
It is arguable that such a term would be implied ex consensu. In 
other words, the seller would have to establish, in accordance with 
the normal 'officious bystander' 
49 
test, that the parties tacitly 
varied the naturalium of the ordinary estate agency contract that 
the agent has no duty even to begin to find a purchaser. However, 
it would seem preferable to regard the term in question as being 
implied ex lege. On that construction, the mere conclusion of a 
sole agency agreement per se gives rise to the implication of a 
different naturalium, namely: The agent has a binding obligation 
to take reasonable steps to find a purchaser (unless it is otherwise 
so agreed). However, this is the bolder view, and it would not be 
surprising if, ex abundanti cautela, the courts were to prefer the 
former view in this untraversed field of the law. 
91. 
Whatever the source of such an obligation, assume for the moment 
that it does exist. Assume further that the sole agent breaches 
it. The disgruntled seller, who may wish to cancel the sole agency 
and appoint other agents, or may wish to sell his property forthwith 
51 through another agent, must nevertheless tread with some caution. 
If he does sell his property through another agent, and the sole 
agent sues him for damages, it may not be sufficient for the seller 
to assert that it is the sole agent who is the culpable party owing 
to his breach of his obligation to use his best endeavours to find 
a purchaser. At the least, the law requires the seller to establish 
that such a breach gave him a right to cancel the contract. 52 In 
addition, he ought to notify the sole agent, in clear and unequivocal 
terms, that he is cancelling the contract, 53 before he sells his 
property through another agent. However, his failure to do so will 
usually not seriously prejudice him. 54 If the sole agent brings 
a suit, cancellation of the contract will presumably occur in the 
pleadings, or even earlier. As a result, the delinquent sole agent 
will not be able to recover damages for the loss of opportunity to 
h . . . 55 earn is commission. 
It is obvious, therefore, that the crucial issue is whether, and 
in what circumstances, the seller will have the right to cancel 
the sole agency. There are two factually possible, but unlikely 
circumstances - the sole agency agreement may have reserved to 
the seller the right to cancel upon breach, or the agent's conduct 
d
. . 56 may amount to repu 1at1on. More probably, the seller will have 
to establish that the agent's conduct amounts to defective or 
92. 
inadequate performance (ie positive malperformance), and that the 
b h . ff. . 1 . . . f 11 · 
57 If h reac 1s su 1c1ent y serious to JUst1 y cance at1on. e 
can do this, no further problem arises. The seller's sale of his 
property through another agent will not amount to an unlawful 
repudiation on his part. But there is one significant danger: 
If the agent has been thoroughly idle, his conduct might be construed 
. 1 f . f . 1 f · 1 58 as negative ma per ormance, 1e a1 ure to per orm t1meous y. 
I h h 11 ·11 h h · h 1 · d" 1 
59 
n sue a case,t e se er w1 ave t e rig t to cance 1rnrne 1ate y 
only in the unlikely event that, expressly or impliedly, time is 
of the essence of the contract and the agent is in mora. However, 
60 
in most cases, neither of these prerequisites will have been met, 
so the seller will have to serve on the agent a combined demand 
f f d . f . . 61 or per ormance an notice o rec1ss1on. The agent will still 
have a reasonable time thereafter to use his best endeavours to 
find a purchaser. It must be emphasized, therefore, that if the 
sole agent's indolence is construed as negative malperformance, 
precipitate behaviour by the seller, such as a hasty sale through 
another agent, or the purported cancellation of the sole agency, 
followed by the appointment of other agents, will in all probability, 
. bl d. . 62 amount to act1ona e repu 1at1on. 
In pr~ctice, given that most sole agency agreements are of a fixed 
duration of between two and four months, the seller may be better 
advised to pressurise the estate agent into more valiant efforts 
whilst simply waiting for the agreement to expire. In fact, sellers 
of property might be best advised not to make sole agency agreements 
at all. Where the sole agency is not one of fixed duration, the 
3.5 
93. 
seller will normally have the right in any event to terminate the 
1 bl . 63 so e agency upon reasona e notice. Of course, the above 
discussion is purely hypothetical. No South African court has 
decided that a sole agent is under any exigible obligation.- It 
may be that when the matter next arises for decision, the court will 
treat termination of a sole agency on much the same basis as 
64 
termination of an ordinary estate agency contract, as discussed 
below. 
Revocation of the Estate Agent's Mandate 
By revoking the estate agent's mandate, the seller can deny the 
agent the opportunity of earning his commission. Sometimes such 
a revocation occurs because the seller is merely dissatisfied with 
the agent (but an equally good course of action in this event is 
simply to appoint further agents). More frequently the seller wishes 
to terminate his relationship with the agent because he has changed 
his mind and no longer wishes to sell, or because, in the case of 
a sole agency, he wishes to sell through another agent, or, where 
he has granted an agent 'sole selling rights' , because he wishes 
to sell to a purchaser that he has himself found~. 
What latitude does the seller possess unilaterally to revoke the 
agent's mandate? The revocation of an agent's mandate is very often 
confused with the revocation of an agent's authority to bind his 
. . l 65 principa. Although it is fairly well settled that, with some 
possible exceptions, a principal may unilaterally revoke his agent's 
94. 
authority, even if it is stated to have been given irrevocably, 
66 
the idea of unilateral revocation of an agent's mandate faces a 
serious difficulty. The formation of a mandate is a bilateral 
juristic act. It would seem that, like any other bilateral contract, 
the agent's mandate should not be unilaterally terminable, with 
impunity. However, there are arguments in favour of the possibility 
of unilateral termination. 
While an estate agent is searching for a suitable purchaser, his 
contract of mandate is executory. 
67 
De Wet notes that there are 
clear statements by the old authorities to the effect that an 
executory contract of mandate can be terminated unilaterally by 
either party. That might seem to conclude this issue, but De Wet 
is less than enthusiastic about this view of the old authorities. 
The learned author believes that it stems from the idea that mandate 
was a gratuitous contract. This is no longer the case in modern 
times when people make a profession out of carrying out tasks for 
others for remuneration. He feels that one should be less ready 
to recognise the revocability of mandates these days, always bearing 
68 
in mind that it is the intention of the parties which is paramount. 
However, that intention is infrequently clearly expressed in the 
seller-estate agent relationship. Many mandates are entered into 
without a time being fixed for their duration, and without provisions 
relating to their termination. Sometimes mandates are stated to 
be irrevocable. On the face of it, then, these agreements might 
endure in perpetuity, as a suitable purchaser may never be found. 
95. 
However, there has been recent case law on the termination of agree-
ments which appear ex facie to be of indefinite duration. 69 As 
one might expect the basis of these decisions involves the implied 
common intention of the parties. 
70 
In the most recent case, the 
Appellate Division stated that where an agreement is silent as to 
its duration, it is terminable on reasonable notice in the absenc.e 
of a conclusion that it was intended to continue indefinitely. 
Moreover, when parties bind themselves to an agreement which requires 
them to work closely together and to have mutual trust and confidence 
in each other, it is reasonable to infer that they did not intend 
to bind themselves indefinitely. 
The Appellate Division was, it is submitted, ,?eneralising about 
agreements containing mutual obligations. Provided one accepts 
that a sole agent will usually have an exigible obligation to take 
reasonable steps to find a purchaser, it seems clear that a sole 
agency of no fixed duration may be terminated upon reasonable notice. 
However, it is submitted that the requirement of reasonable notice 
may not be necessary in ordinary cases of estate agency, which do 
not involve mutual ob~igations to perform. 
71 
A number of reasons 
may be advanced in support of this submission. First, one of the 
reasons for requiring reasonable notice is the assumption that the 
parties intended to avoid the possibility of wasted expenditure 
. f . . f h · bl· · 72 H in per arming or preparing to per orm t eir o igations. owever, 
the conventional estate agent has no obligation to perform, no 
indemnity for his expenses, 
73 
and in fact, no obligation to incur 




but for a result. Secondly, the agent for his part, 
ordinarily 
75 
has the right summarily to terminate the mandate. 
Thirdly, as the seller has both the right to refuse, summarily, 
to sell his property to a purchaser introduced by the agent, and 
the right to sell the property, at any time, through another agent, 
the prima facie inference must surely be against a requirement of 
reasonable notice. 
Therefore, generally, apart from cases of sole agency, it is sub-
mitted that the seller need not give reasonable notice to the estate 
agent - he may summarily revoke the mandate quite lawfully. 
76 
The. 
foregoing discussion is based on the implication as to the parties' 
intentions. A shorter route to the same conclusion may be found 
in the assertion that, because of its peculiar nature, the estate 
agent's mandate bears the naturalium that unless the parties agree 
otherwise, the seller may summarily revoke it with impunity. 
Of course, the seller cannot deprive an agent of his commission 
by revoking the agent's mandate just prior to concluding a sale 
with a purchaser introduced by the agent. Provided the agent's 
efforts during the currency of the mandate are the efficient cause 
of the sale, he is entitled to his commission even if the sale takes 
place after the termination of his mandate (whether or not such 
. . . . d b . . ) 77 termination was inspire y an improper motive. 
Finally,if a time has been fixed for the expiry of the estate agent's 
mandate, it would seem that unilateral revocation of the mandate 
97. 
by the seller before that time, will probably expose him to a claim 
78 
for damages. 
4. ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
In a claim for damages by the estate agent, the court compensates 
·79 
the estate agent for the loss of the opportunity to perform. 
It is possible that even if the seller had not committed an unlawful 
act, the agent may not have been able to find a suitable purchaser. 
Even if he had been able to do so, another agent may have found 
a purchaser already, or for one reason or another, a sale may not 
have eventuated. What has to be valued is the agent's chance of 
. h" . . 80 earning is commission. As a result, it will be rare for the 
agent to recover his full commission as damages, although each case 
· 11 f . f 81 wi , o course, turn on its own acts. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In general, an agent will seldom have a successful claim for damages 
against the seller who prevents him from earning his commission. 
The seller does commit a breach of his contract of mandate if: 
1) he sells his property through another agent during the currency 
of a sole agency agreemenL However, it is su.bmitted that 
the sole agent will usually have an exigible obligation to 
take reasonable steps to fulfil his mandate, failing which, 
98. 
the seller will be justified in cancelling the sole agency, 
and in selling his property through another agent. 
2) he himself sells his property when he has agreed not to do 
so. Such an agreement is not necessarily to be inferred from 
a sole agency agreement. The seller, at the very least, must 
confer 'sole selling rights' on the agent. 
3) he revokes the agent's mandate before the agreed date of expiry, 
or where there is no agreed date of expiry, he revokes a sole 
agent's mandate without affording him reasonable notice.
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Where the agent does find a suitable purchaser, there are limited 
circumstances in which the seller's conduct may prevent the earning 
by the estate agent of his commission, in a manner inconsistent 
with the parties' original intentions. In these circumstances, 
which do not include the seller's refusal to contract with the would-
be purchaser, the agent may employ the doctrine of fictional fulfil-








Bird v Sumerville and Another 1960 (4) SA 395 (N) at 410; John H 
Pritchard and Associates (Pty) Ltd v Thorny Park Estates (Pty) Ltd 
1967 (2) SA 511 (D) at 517A-D. 
Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941) AC 108 at 124; accepted and 
approved by Murray Jin Gluckman v Landau & Co 1944 TPD 261 at 267. 
John H Pritchard's case supra note 1 at 517C. See also SJ Stoljar 
The Law of Agency, its History and Present Principles (1961) 318. 
Gluckman v Landau supra note 2 at 282, affirmed in Brayshaw v 
Schoeman en Andere 1960 (1) SA 625 (A) at 630. 
Brayshaw v Schoeman supra note 4. 





Alternatively, one may view the situation as English law seems to 
do: The estate agent's entitlement to his commission and the 
completion of performance of his mandate do coincide; but a mandate 
to 'find a purchaser' is only performed when the agent 'finds' a 
person who, not only is willing and able to purchase, but also 
actually becomes a 'purchaser' by concluding a binding sale with 
the seller. See Boots v E Christopher & Co [1951) 2 All ER 1045. 
See Vanarthdoy (Edms) Bpk v Roos 1979 (4) SA 1 (A). 
There are many cases, especially where competing agents are involved, 
where it cannot be said that the second agent 'introduced' the 
ultimate purchaser, and yet it is implicit that he is the agent 
who is entitled to commission because he has been the efficient 
cause of the sale: Eschini v Jones 1929 CPD 18; Mostert v Goodwood 
Land & Property Agency 1940 (2) PH A61; Herbert Penny (Pty) Ltd 





See for example Abel v Perks 1923 EDL 285; Webranchek v L K Jacobs 
& Co (Pty) Ltd 1948 (4) SA 671 (A); Van Aswegen v De Clerg 1960 
(4) SA 875 (A); Wakefield and Sons (Pty) Ltd v Anderson 1965 (4) 
SA 453 (N); Volkwyn v Aida Real Estate (Pty) Ltd 1966 (2) PH A61 
(T); Howard & Decker Witkoppen Agencies and Fourways Estates (Pty) 
Ltd v De Sousa 1971 (3) SA 937 (T); Roy Barrier & Co (Pvt) Ltd v 
Wakefield 1971 (2) PH A57. 
See the cases cited in note 9 supra, and Peckover v Goldschmidt 
and Co (1881) 1 HCG 59; Mackie v Whyte & Turpin Ltd 1923 TPD 347; 
Barnard &· Parry Ltd v Strydom 1946 AD 931; Gordon v Slotar 1973 
(3) SA 765 (A); MLP Slabbert & Kiev Daubern 1975 (1) PH A20 (T); 
Alfred County Estate Agency (Pty) Ltd v Ebner 1979 (2) PH A38. 
In Brayshaw v Schoeman supra note 4 it was held that, as a general 
proposition, a mandate to find a purchaser envisages the conclusion 
of a valid sale ( 'geldige koop') as the event which entitles the 
estate agent to commission, unless additional considerations or 
indiciae favour another construction. It is clear from the text 
(at 630) that Van Blerk JA was referring to a binding sale. 
Subsequent cases have interpreted Brayshaw in this fashion. See 
Reyneke v Botha 1977 (3) SA 20 (T) at 23G where a distinction is 
drawn between a valid and a binding contract. 
In Gluckman v Landau supra note 2 at 273, it was stated: 
"[The agent need do no] more than introduce the eventual purchaser 
to the principal ••• then if a sale to such person results ••• and 
if the facts are that such introduction is the efficient cause of 
the conclusion of the sale (even though the agent may not have been 
the first introducer of the eventual purchaser ••• ) the commission 
has been earned." 
See too Aida Real Estate Ltd v Lipschitz 1971 (3) SA 871 (W) at 
873F; Webranchek v L K Jacobs supra note 10. 
14. In Luxor's case supra note 2 at 119-120, the Lord Chancellor made 
the following appropriate remarks: 
'There is ••• considerable difficulty, and no little danger, in 
trying to formulate general propositions on such a subject, for 
contracts with commission agents do not follow a single pattern 
and the primary necessity in each instance is to ascertain with 
precision what are the • • • terms of the particular contract under 
discussion • • • Each case turns on its own · facts and the phrase 
"finding a purchaser" is itself not without ambiguity.' 
See also The Firs Investment Ltd v Levy Bros Estates (Pty) Ltd 1984 




Brayshaw v · Schoeman supra note 4 did not contemplate a sale which 
is subject to a suspensive condition, so it remains an open question 
whether, when a sale is subject to a suspensive condition, the 
agent's right to commission accrues, as a general proposition, when 
the binding sale is concluded or only when it becomes enforceable. 
Although there are cogent reasons to support the former proposition, 
the latter is more expedient and, in practice, many estate agents 
are content to agree that their rights to commission should accrue 
only when the sale becomes enforceable by fulfilment of any 
suspensive condition. At first glance, Naidu v Naidoo 1967 (2) 
SA 223 (N) appears to support the latter proposition, and thus to 
put a gloss on Brayshaw. In fact, however, Naidu v Naidoo can be 
safely ignored. In that case, it was held that the agent's right 
to commission depended upon a valid sale being entered into between 
seller and purchaser. Relying on Corondimas v Badat 1946 AD 548, 
the Court held that as the contract was subject to a suspensive 
condition, no valid binding agreement of sale had been concluded, 
hence the estate agent was not entitled to recover his commission. 
This form of reasoning has been seriously discredited: Tuckers 
Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Strydom 1984 (1) 
SA 1 (A). In Commercial Business Brokers v Hassen 1985 (3) SA 583 
(N) the parties had agreed that the agent's commission would become 
payable upon signature of the contract of sale. The agent was held 
to be entitled to his commission despite the fact that the sale 
fell away as a result of non-fulfilment of a suspensive condition 
to which it was subject. 
Oliver v Diamond and Another 1955 (1) PH A22. DJ Joubert Die Suid 
Afrikaanse Verteenwoordigingsreg (1979) 250, 258-9 curiously enough 
seems to think that such agreements are the norm. He cites no 
authority and one can only assume that he may have been misled by 
certain · dicta in Brayshaw' s case supra note 3 at 630. See also 
PH Havenga 'Die Reg Van 'N Eiendomsagent Op Betaling Van Kommissie' 
(1986) 49 THRHR 105. 
As a general proposition, such a construction of the parties' agree-
ment is the norm in English law: Boots v E Christopher·& Co supra 
note 7. Such a construction makes the estate agent a virtual 
guarantor of the performance of the purchaser's obligations. It 
would require the clearest language to persuade a South African 
court that such an agreement had been reached: Badenhorst v Van 
Rensburg 1985 (2) SA 321 (T) at 330; De Villiers and Macintosh The 
Law of Agency in South Africa (3 edl981 by J M Silke) 380-382. 
17. The probabilities are against a seller making such a disadvantageous 
agreement. It exerts unfair pressure on the seller's proper freedom 
of contract, for if he does not wish to sell to that particular 
purchaser or if he wishes to accept a better later offer made to 
him by another purchaser, he may do so only upon pain of paying 
the estate agent his commission for what has turned out to be a 
fruitless introduction. He may 
on the sale of his property. 
Rapacioli [1974] 2 All ER 311 
was upheld. 
102. 
thus end up paying two commissions 
In Christie Owen & Davies Ltd v 
it appears that such an agreement 
18. In Midgley Estates Ltd v Hand [1952] 1 All ER 1394 it was held that 
an agreement that commission was to be paid 'as soon as our purchaser 
shall have signed a legally binding contract' meant that the agent 
was entitled to his commission upon the occurrence of that event, 
even though that purchaser was unable to pay. In general, this 
particular result would not obtain in South Africa: Roux v Schreuder 
1968 (3) SA 616 (O). 
19. Nel v Grobbelaar & Viljoen Agentskappe (Edms) Bpk 1983 (4) SA 436 
(O). 
20. In Preller v Jordaan 1956 (1) SA 483 (A) it was held that 'designedly' 
means with an intention to act inequitably. 
21. MacDuff & Co Ltd v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd 1924 
AD 573. 
22. In Whyte v Da Costa Couto 1985 (4) SA 672 (A) at 680, it was remarked 
that the meaning of dolus in this regard has not yet been precisely 
delineated. 
23. Koenig v Johnson & Co Ltd 1935 AD 262 at 271 per Wessels CJ. See 
also De Villiers and Macintosh op cit note 16 at 413 and RH Christie 
The.Law of Contract in South Africa (1981) 136-9. 
24. If the seller fails to conclude a binding contract because a 
purchaser cannot be found, or because he cannot reach agreement 
with the proposed purchaser, then the suspensive condition fails 
naturally. On the other hand, once a binding sale is concluded., 
the agent's right to commission accrues. If the seller or the 
purchaser later resiles, the seller remains liable to the agent: 
Levy v Phillips 1915 AD 139; Consolidated Estates & Trusts Ltd v 
Turnbull 1924 TPD 1; Gluckman v Landau supra note 2. In neither 
case does any question of fictional fulfilment arise. 
25. Bird v Sumerville and Another 1961 (3) SA 194 (A) at 202. See also 
Gluckman v Landau supra note 2 at 273-280 where the authority to 
the contrary in Ismail v Prentice 1929 TPD 539 and in particular 
Boose v Zeederberg and Duncan 1918 CPD 283 is criticised. See also 
De Villiers & Macintosh op cit note 16 at 409-412, and particularly 
at 414. 
103. 
26. Where, however, the event entitling the agent to commission is the 
mere introduction of a person willing and able to purchase who makes 
an adequate offer, it is difficult to see how the seller can act 
to designedly prevent this from happening. Even if such circum-
stances arose, it may be more properly a case of mora creditoris 
than fictional fulfilment. 
27. The two instances will usually amount to bad faith by the seller 
towards the purchaser, rather than towards the estate agent. However, 
even as regards the estate agent, such conduct probably falls within 
the term dolus in its 'widest sense'. 
28. Unless it was the common intention of the parties that the seller's 
repudiation would not make him liable for the agent's commission. 
See Oliver v Diamond supra note 16. 
29. De Wet en Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg ( 4 ed 1978 by J C de Wet 
and AH van Wyk) 136-7. The learned authors also make the reasonable 
suggestion that a condition should be regarded as fictionally not 
fulfilled if it is in fact fulfilled, but in a manner contrary to 
the parties' intentions. 
30. This formulation clearly overlaps but is not coincident with the 
term dolus in its widest sense. 
31. Gowan v Bowern 1924 AD 550 at 565. On the peculiar facts of this 
case, the 'agent's' claim failed. 
32. The purchaser is not 'a person who would subject to • • • fulfilment 
(of the condition suspending the seller's promise to pay) be bound 
by an obligation I to the agent. In the second example, performance 
by the purchaser of his obligations is the very fact upon which 
the agent's right to commission is predicated, so his failure to 
recover his commission seems fair. Not so in the first example 
where the lack of vinculum iuris with the purchaser will operate 
rather harshly to deprive the agent of his commission. 'Acceptance' 
of the purchaser's repudiation will not constitute dolus on the 
part of the seller, it is submitted. 
33. In this sense unfettered refers to lawfulness vis-a-vis the agent 
not to the seller's right actually to retain his property. Obviously 
no one can compel the seller to contract and to transfer his property. 
104. 
34. It is submitted that the seller ought not to have to establish an 
implied term that it was the common intention of the parties that 
he should have an unqualified right to refuse-to sell his property. 
Such a term ought to arise ex lege. It would then be for the agent 














Note 2 supra at 53-4 and 61-2, approved in Gluckman v Landau note 
2 supra at 274. 
Bundshuh v Finnegan 1975 (1) SA 376 (~). It is only a sale of the 
property by himself or by another agent that may be unlawful in 
that event. 
Gluckman v Landau supra note 2 at 275. 
Michael James (Pty) Ltd v Trafford 1983 (2) PH A68 (C). See also 
Ben tall, Horsley & Baldry v Vicary [1931] 1 KB 253; De Villiers 
& Macintosh op cit note 16 at 411; J R Murdoch The Law of Estate 
Agency and Auctions (2 ed 1984) 272-3. 
De Villiers and Macintosh ibid, Murdoch ibid. 
Supra note 19. 
At 444. 
The Firs case supra note 14. 
Note 1 supra. 
De Coning v Monror Estate & Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1974 (3) SA 
72 (E); Gazonis v Randland Trust 1971 (2) PH A56 (T). 
See Murdoch op cit note 38 at 217-220. 
His Lordship's judgment in Mendoza & Co v Bell ( 1952) 159 Estates 
Gazette 372 is summarised, not fully reported. See too E Christopher 
& Co v Essig (1948) Weekly Notes 461, also not fully reported. 
105. 
4 7. Since the issue in both of these English cases was whether there 
was any consideration moving from the promisee, they are not strictly 
pertinent to South African law. 
48. Murdoch remarks (op cit note 38 at 219) that since the vendor in 
Mendoza's case ( supra note 46) had claimed that it was precisely 
because he was getting no benefit from the appointment of a sole 
agent that he should not be liable for breach of the sole agency 
agreement, his Lordship's reasoning assumes the very thing it sets 
out to prove. Murdoch raises two objections to the idea of an 
implied obligation to 'take reasonable steps' to find a purchaser. 
His first objection is that the content of the obligation is 
difficult to delineate. In the recent English case of Glentree 
Estates Ltd v Gee ( 1981) 259 EG 332 the client of a sole agent 
. suggested that the. agent was und.E:!r a duty t_o advise him as to price 
and sale, to give him regular progress reports and to negotiate 
with the applicants in an effort to raise the price, but the Court 
expressed strong doubts as to whether any such duties were owed. 
However, in principle, mere difficulty in delineating the content 
of the obligation need not cast doubt on its existence, it is 
submitted. The second objection is that it would be extremely 
difficult for the seller to prove that a breach of such an obligation 
had caused any loss. With respect to the learned author, this is 
hardly relevant. The seller will seldom wish to sue the sole agent 
for damages. He will wish to cancel the sole agency agreement. 
To do so, he needs to prove breach, not loss. 
49. Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) Ltd [1918} 1 KB 592 at 
605; Van den Berg v Tenner 1975 (2) SA 268 (A). 
SO. There is a third possibility viz the ordinary naturalium of estate 
agency that the agent has no exigible obligation exists, but the 
fact of a sole agency gives rise to a prima facie inference that 
the parties have tacitly varied the naturalium. The sole agent 
would thus bear the duty of rebuttal even though the seller would 
bear the overall onus of proving the implied term concerning the 
exigible obligation. 
51. There are other possible courses of action. It is possible, but 
unlikely, that the seller would wish to claim damages. He will 
have to show loss and that the agent's failure merely to take reason-
able steps to find a purchaser was the cause of that loss. The 
seller might also seek a decree of specific performance. It is 
submitted that his prospect of success would, in general, be remote. 
In any event, few sellers would actually wish to have an indolent 








If the seller's conduct were to amount to a denial of his contractual 
liabilites, he would still be guilty of repudiation even if he 
honestly believed that he was entitled so to act: Dennill v Atkins 
& Co 1905 TS 282. 
Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A); Jaffer 
v Falante 1959 (4) SA 360 (C) at 362F, approved in Swart v Vosloo 
1965 (1) SA 100 (A). See also A J Kerr The Principles of the Law 
of Contract (3 ed 1980) 391-3. 
Although the sole agent generally has no indemnity for his expenses, 
as it is postulated that he is bound to take reasonable steps to 
find a purchaser, it must surely be envisaged by both parties that 
he will be expending both time and money. As a result, it is 
submitted that, if the seller fails to notify the estate agent of 
the cancellation, the estate agent may well have a claim for wasted 
expenditure occasioned by such failure, despite the fact that he 
was originally in breach of his obligations to take reasonable steps/ 
use his best endeavours to find a purchaser. 
But he may have the claim described in note 54 supra. 
Repudiation consists in words or conduct exhibiting a deliberate 
and unequivocal intention no longer to be bound· by the contract: 
see eg Inrybelange (Edms) Bpk v Pretorius 1966 (2) SA 416 (A); Nash 
v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 1985 (3) SA 1 (A) at 22. However, the 
injured party may cancel only if the breach which the repudiation 
portends is sufficiently serious. 
Spies v Lombard 1950 (3) SA 469 (A) at 486ff.. De Wet en Yeats op 
cit note 29 at 162-3. 
58. See, generally, Sweet v Ragerguhara 1978 (1) SA 131 (D) and WA 
Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa ('LAWSA') (Vol 5 1978) paras 
201-208. 
59. It is the right to take immediate steps which is at issue. Most 
sole agencies are of a very short fixed duration, so any remedy 
which involves the giving of notice of a reasonable time would not 
be worth much. · 
60. There is hardly ever a time fixed for performance in estate agency 
contracts. Where the sole agency is one of fixed duration, the 
date fixed pertains to the limit of the exclusivity of the sole 
agent's right to find a purchaser. It is not the due date for the 













Nel v Cloete 1972 (2) SA 150 (A) at 163E. 
This gives rise to the curious result that the agent i~ better off 
being utterly indolent, rather than merely relatively so. See 
Sweet's case supra note 58 at 138F. 
Where an agreement is silent as to its duration, it is terminable 
on reasonable notice in the absence of a conclusion that it was 
intended to continue indefinitely. Moreover, when parties bind 
themselves to an agreement which requires them to have mutual trust 
and confidence in each other, it is reasonable to infer that they 
did not intend to bind themselves indefinitely: Putco Ltd v TV 
& Radio Guarantee Co (Pty) Ltd 1985 (4) SA 809 (A). 
That is, indolence by the sole agent does not. amouht to breach and is 
not per sea ground for termination of the contract. The sole agency 
will usually terminate on the agreed date, or, if no date has been 
agreed, it is revocable at least upon reasonable notice. It is 
submitted in the text (at 16) that ordinary estate agency mandates 
are terminable summarily, but the same is unlikely to be true of 
sole agencies, as it would seldom reflect the common intentions 
of the parties. 
JC de Wet in LAWSA (Vol 1 1976) par 125. 
Ibid. It is utterly clear that, frequently, an authority which 
is conferred 'irrevocably' is nevertheless unilaterally revocable 
by the principal. Where the dispute exists is whether there are 
situations where the principal may not do so. De Wet loc cit note 
65 seems doubtful. See also Consolidated Frame Cotton Corporation 
Ltd v Sithole 1985 (2) SA 18 (N) at 22; The Firs supra note 14 at 
886. 
Ibid. The learned author also cites cases 
proposition, but they hardly bear it out. 
1978) par 226. 
De Wet en Yeats op cit note 29 at 343. 
( par l 25n4) for this 
See too L:AWSA (Vol 5 
Trident Sales (Pty) Ltd v A H Fillman and Sons (Pty) Ltd 1984 (1) 
SA 433 (W); Putco supra note 63. See too, P R Owens 'Contracts 
for an Indefinite Period' (1982) 45 THRHR 23. 












There is no proper South African authority on the subject of the 
unilateral revocation of an estate agent's mandate. The cases which 
do deal with estate agents and revocation, are concerned with estate 
agents who do not have mere mandates to 'find a purchaser' but full 
authority from the seller to sell his property. See Van Der Merwe 
v Ras 1912 TPD 97; Botha v Schultz 1966 (2) SA 615 (O); Pretorius 
v Erasmus 1975 (2) SA 765 (T) and The ·Firs supra note 14. 
See the reasoning in Putco Ltd v TV & Radio Guarantee Co (Pty) Ltd 
1984 (1) SA 443 (W) at 451. 
LC B Gower 'Estate Agents' Commission' (1950) 13 Modern Law Review 
491. 
Note 3 supra. 
Unless, of course, it is clear that the parties have agreed otherwise. 
See De Villiers & Macintosh op cit note 16 at 626 and LAWSA (Vol 
5 1978) par 226. 
See De Villiers & Macintosh op cit note 16 at 616. Tony Morgan 
Estates v Pinto 1982 (4) SA 171 (W) deals with the issue of revocation 
by the seller of an agent's mandate. However, the question of reason-
able notice did not arise for consideration. It seems that in English 
law the courts are reluctant to hold that an agent is entitled to 
notice when he is employed upon a commission basis: Murdoch op cit 
note 38 at 154-5. 
Woolle-y v Hunt and Birkley (1894) 7 HCG 99; Steyn v Joubert 1923 
TPD 275; De Jongh v Owen Wiggins Trust Maatskappy Bpk 1977 (2) PH 
A43 (A). 
This is an academic point as regards ordinary estate agency. In 
practice, the seller may, lawfully, ref use to sell to any purchaser 
introduced by the agent, and, he may appoint other agents to find 
a purchaser. 
Hampton & Sons Ltd v George [1939] 3 All ER 627 at 630. 
Tony Morgan's case supra note 76 at 177, affirming Hampton & Sons 
supra note 79. 
109. 
81. See De Villiers & Macintosh op cit note 16 at 411 and 623, and Murdoch 
op cit note 38 at 273. These general principles were accepted by 
the court in Tony Morgan's case supra note 76, al though the agent 
in that case was successful in recovering as damages his full 
commission. It was held that the fact that the mandate was revocable 
was a factor to be taken into account in assessing the agent's 
damages. 
The following English cases are illustrative: Hampton & Sons Ltd 
supra note 79 damages of £80 awarded. Commission would have been 
£104. In Newton v Erikson (1951) 157 EG 414 damages of £75 against 
commission of £115 and HM Rendall v Lemmas 1967 CLY 36, £87 damages 
against £97 commission. 
82. Summary cancellation of the sole agent's mandate would be possible 
where the sole agent is guilty of positive malperformance of the 




Watson v Fintrust Properties (Pty) Ltd was reported in the June edition 
of the South African Law Reports at 1987 (2) SA 739 (C). It was an 
application by the defendant, the seller, to compel the plaintiff, estate 
agent, to disclose whether the purchaser had been willing and able to 
purchase. As it was an interlocutory matter, there are no decided facts 
on which to rely. It seems that the estate agent's case was that his 
mandate was to 'bring about a sale' and that the seller and purchaser had 
indeed concluded a valid, binding, sale. The purchaser did not fulfil her 
obligations and the sale was later cancelled. 
It is clear law that in these circumstances, even if it is the purchaser 
who unlawfully resiles from the contract, the seller remains liable to the. 
estate agent ( see note 24 at page 102 supra). The ratio of the case was 
that it was for the seller to raise and prove the allegation that the 
purchaser was not, at the time of contracting, willing and able to purchase. 
However, the Court did make reference to the doctrine of fictional fulfil-
ment (although it is clear that the agent's case rested on actual fulfil-
ment). It is submitted that if the agent's right to commission had depended 
on payment of the purchase price, and the seller had agreed to release the 
purchaser before such payment, then it would indeed have been a case of 
fictional fulfilment of the condition of the seller's promise to pay (see 
page 85 supra). But the Court was of the opinion, correctly it is submitted, 
with respect, that the stipulation that the agent was to receive his 
commission out of the deposit to be paid by the purchaser, was only a time 
111. 
clause. It seems that it was the time clause that the Court regarded as. 
fictionally fulfilled (as in Ferndale Investments (Pty) Ltd v DICK Trust 
Ltd 1968 (1) SA 392 (A)). 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as the ratio of this case dealt with an interlocutory matter, and 
as the principal obiter dicta were in accord with Levy v Phillips 1915 AD 
139, and Ferndale' s case supra, it is an uncontroversial case. If I had 
had this case at my disposal before the completion of Treatise III, I would 
have mentioned it in the footnotes. 
TREATISE IV 
112. 
THE EFFECT OF SUSPENSIVE CONDITIONS IN CONTRACTS OF SALE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Academic writers have long championed the view expressed in the 
Od d 1 M · · 1 · l h ff f en aa srust un1c1pa 1ty case as to t e e ect o a suspensive 
condition on a contract of sale - namely, that the condition operates 
merely to suspend the operation of the obligations under the con-
tract, or more accurately, 
2 
their exigible content. The writers 
have contended that in spite of the presence of the condition, there 
is, from the very outset, 
3 
an extant contract of sale. For the 
first time in the recent decision of Tuckers Land and Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Strydom,
4 
the Appellate Division has declared 
itself favourably disposed to such a view. It has turned away from 
its own consistently followed decision of Corondimas & Another v 
Badat, 5 · which suggested that although the parties were bound to 
each other from the outset, a contract of sale came into existence 
only upon fulfilment of the suspensive condition. Yet, despite 
its shift in viewpoint, the Appellate Division has declined to depart 
from Corondirnas. 
It is the purpose of this paper to re-examine the issue of the legal 
effect of suspensive conditions, 
7 
principally as regards contracts 
of sale. 
113. 
2. THE LAW PRIOR TO TUCKERS LAND V STRYDOM
8 
In the nineteenth-century case of Quirk's Trustees v Assignees of 
Liddle & Co, 9 the parties purported to conclude a contract of sale 
in terms of which ownership in the res was reserved to the seller 
until the purchaser had paid the purchase price in full. De Villiers 
CJ held that a contract incorporating such a 'condition' was 'quite 
inconsistent with the very essence of a contract of sale' •
10 
Lest 
it should be thought that Quirk's case was authority for the 
proposition that pending fulfilment of the condition there was no 
contract at all, Innes CJ explained, in Leo v Loots, 11 that although 
the effect of a suspensive condition is to suspend the entire sale, 
there is from the outset 'a very real and definite contractual 
relationship between the parties'. The above two cases were followed 
on many occasions. 12 The law was more fully elucidated in the lead-
ing case of Corondimas v Badat, 13 in which Watermeyer CJ stated: 
'Until (fulfilment of the condition) ••• it is entirely uncertain 
whether or not a contract of sale will come into existence 
at some future time. Until that moment there is certainly 
a legal relationship... existing between the parties, which 
. . f 1 I 14 may ripen into a contract o sa e ; 
114. 
and Feetham AJA further explained: 
'Where an agreement of purchase and sale is entered into subject 
to a suspensive condition, no contract of sale is there and 
then established, but there is nevertheless created "a very 
real and definite contractual' relationship" which, on fulfilment 
of the condition, develops into a relationship of seller and 
15 
purchaser. ' 
The alternative viewpoint is embodied in the judgment of Van den 
Heever J (as he then was) in the Odendaalsrust16 case: 
'The contract... is binding immediately upon its conclusion; 
what may be suspended by a condition is the resultant obligation 
or its exigible content.' 
Most academics have adopted this dictum as support for their view 
that a sale subject to a suspensive condition is nevertheless a 
17 
sale from the outset. They trenchantly criticise the concept 
that the agreement is, in modern parlance, an innominate contract 
at the outset which, only upon fulfilment of the condition, ripens 
into a contract of sale. Such an idea is treated as having no 
logical basis. It is said that the so-called innominate contract 
bears all the elements of a sale, namely, the parties have agreed 
on the goods to be sold(~), the price to be paid (pretium) and 
18 
they have the intention that one shall be exchanged for the other. 
With respect, however true that may be, it hardly advances matters 
much. 19 
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It has also been pointed out, correctly, that the f ons et origo 
of the innominate contract theory, Quirk's case, 19 was dealing not 
. h . d . . b · h d · 20 wit a suspensive con ition, ut wit a pactum a 1ectum. Moreover, 
the reasoning in that case was based upon a demonstrable 
misinterpretation of the old authorities.
21 However, as the 
22 
Appellate Di vision in Tuckers Land v Strydom pointed out as it 
overruled Quirk's case, the fact that Quirk's case is wrong does 
not mean that the principle enunciated in Corondimas is also wrong.
23 
Whatever the respective merits of the two views, there might well 
have been little controversy. After all, there is no dispute what-
ever about the substantive legal effect of a suspensive condition 
on an agreement in these circumstances. Three of the main effects 
b . d 24 may e mentione; 
(i) Each party's obligation to perform is suspended, ie it is not 
enforceable by the other party until and unless the future, 
uncertain event occurs. 
(ii) Normally the parties make their conditional promises with the 
common intention that each of them is bound to await the outcome 
f h d
. . 25 
o t e con ition. A unilateral attempt to withdraw from 
h d d . . 26 · 11 t e agreement pen ente con icione wi amount to actionable 
d · · 
27 Th · · d t · 11 repu iation. e inJure par y wi be able to recover 
damages, or, in appropriate circumstances, to invoke the 
doctrine of fictional fulfilment, or even to obtain an inter-
dict restraining the unlawful conduct.
28 
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(iii) Pendente condicione there is vested in each party a conditional 
right to the promised performance, which right is capable 
of being alienated by the conditional creditor, 29 and, on 
h . d h . . ·bl h. h · 3o is eat, is transm1ss1 e to is eirs. 
Given that these consequences are beyond dispute, it would seem 
ordinarily not to matter much what name, if any, is given to the 
initial agreement. Indeed, it would seem to be a matter of semantics. 
However, following the collapse of the property market in the mid-
1970's, the seller, 31 in a number of township development cases, 
was forced to argue that the 'sale' which it had concluded subject 
to a suspensive condition was not truly a contract of sale, but 
an innominate contract. It was important to establish this in order 
to circumvent a statutory prohibition against the sale of township 
erven prior to due proclamation of the township as such by the 
appropriate authorities. On the whole, the courts were favourably 
disposed to such an argument, and after the Appellate Division 
affirmed the Corondimas stance in Palm Fifteen (Pty) Ltd v Cotton 
Tail Homes (Pty) Ltd, 32 the innominate contract theory held sway. 
However, Tuckers Land v Strydom now signals a shift in the view 
of the Appellate Division. 
3. TUCKERS LAND V STRYDOM 
Tuckers Land v Strydom was yet another township development case 
in which the developer attempted to establish that an agreement 
was not a contract of sale at the time it was concluded, because 
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the agreement was subject to a suspensive condition. The developer 
succeeded, despite the fact that the Appellate Division was 
unanimously critical of the principle enunciated in Corondimas. 
Van Heerden JA, who delivered the majority judgment, observed that 
it was difficult to see, on logical grounds, how the simple insertion 
of a suspensive condition in an agreement could per se preclude 
such agreement from being a sale properly so-called. He clearly 
preferred the Odendaalsrust view that a suspensive condition operates 
merely to suspend the exigible content of the obligations arising 
under the contract, and does not operate to affect the existence 
f h 1 . f . 33 o t e contract, or to qua i y its nature. However, even on the 
assumption that Corondimas was clearly wrong, the learned judge 
of appeal declined to depart from it on the ground that many legal 
rights and duties would doubtless have been created in reliance 
on it, especially since the Appellate Division itself had confirmed 
the principle in the Palm Fifteen case. 
Joubert JA delivered a separate judgment which contained a close 
examination of the old authorities. He was more critical of 
Corondimas. He stated that it was at odds with the common law, 
was wrong, and ought not to be followed. He approved 
34 the view 
of De Wet & Yeats that a suspensive condition does not bear on the 
existence of the contract or the category into which it falls. 
35 
In the view of Joubert JA, a sale subject to a suspensive condition 
was nevertheless an extant contract of sale, albeit a conditional 
one, pending fulfilment of the condition. However, he too upheld 
the appeal, on the basis that, as a matter of interpretation, such 
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a conditional sale did not fall within the ambit of the relevant 
statutory prohibition.36 
The decision not to depart from Corondimas, whilst at the same time 
being highly critical of it, makes the present position of South 
African law a little uncertain. The Appellate Division will probably 
be constrained to follow the approach of Tuckers Land v Strydom 
should another, similar township development case come before it 
37 
in the near future, although it seems that Van Heerden JA was 
anticipating legislation which would preclude such an eventuality. 38 
In any event, it is not the purpose of this paper to dwell on this 
narrow point. It is submitted that it is a clear inference from 
the sharp critic ism of Corondimas that, apart from township develop-
ment cases, the innominate contract theory is wrong and no longer 
represents the law. As regards all other sales and other contracts 
generally, the courts are now not constrained to follow Corondimas. 
Generally, it is not arguable, it is submitted, that the mere 
insertion of suspensive condition per se gives rise to an innominate 
contract, and precludes the existence of a contract of sale until 
the condition is fulfilled. 
4. EVALUATION 
I do not intend to re-examine the old authorities or the substantial 
body of case law in order to delineate the true nature of a legal 
rule pertaining to the effect of a suspensive condition on a contract 
of sale. It is beyond question that the Odendaalsrust formula as 
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interpreted by the academics and Tuckers Land v Strydom is logical 
and correct, and it is submitted, now represents the law - I predict 
that the courts will now rule that the usual effect of a suspensive 
condition is purely to suspend the exigibility of the obligations 
under a contract, and not to qualify the existence or the nature 
of the contract. However, there is danger in regarding the 
Odendaalsrust formula as determinative of every case. It may well 
be the proper prima facie approach when adjudging the legal effect 
of a suspensive condition, but it is inappropriate to deal with 
all suspensive conditions. There is no inflexible rule that a 
suspensive condition may never qualify the existence or the nature 
of a contract. In truth, the legal effect of a suspensive condition 
depends upon the intention of the parties. 39 
To illustrate this point, consider that there do exist, albeit 
rarely, suspensive conditions which qualify the existence of a 
contract. In such cases, .the parties have essentially not completed 
the process of reaching agreement. So, where parties reach an agree-
ment 'subject to contract', it is submitted that the proper inference 
may be that they do not intend to be bound until a formal contractual 
d . d 40 ocument is execute • The parties may intend that the agreement 
that they have reached should be regarded as provisional. Either 
of them is free to negotiate a variation in the terms of the agree-
ment or to withdraw from the agreement with impunity before the 
suspensive condition is fulfilled, ie before the execution of the 
formal document. Such a result is well known in English 
but it is not a usual practice of South African commerce. 
41 law, 
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Secondly, it is submitted that there do exist suspensive conditions 
which qualify the nature of the contract. The contracting parties 
may, for their own reasons, intend such a result. An example is 
afforded by the case of Provident Land Trust Ltd v Union Government 
(Minister of Mines). 42 In that case, the parties expressly 
stipulated that a contract of sale should only arise in the future, 
uncertain event that the would-be buyer paid a certain sum of money. 
Until and unless that occurred he was to be regarded as a tenant 
of the property. Therefore, in this exceptional case, the contract 
was not from the outset a contract of sale. Its nature was qualified 
by the suspensive condition because the parties so intended. 43 
The facts of Corondimas 44 are also instructive. In that case, a 
European wished to sell land to an Asiatic provided that the 
requisite Ministerial consent could be obtained. The parties would 
have broken the law had they entered into a contract of sale without 
such consent. Mindful of this, they clearly intended, it is 
submitted, to enter into an agreement which was not yet a sale but 
which would bind them both to await the outcome of the Minister's 
decision. Neither party could withdraw pending such a decision. 
If the Minister gave his consent, the suspensive condition would 
be fulfilled, and the agreement would ripen into a valid and 
immediately binding contract of sale. A third example is suggested 
by Mendelowitz: 45 A and B agree that if A gets a rise in salary, 
he will buy B's house at a determined price. Mendelowitz asserts 
that whilst this is a binding contract it I is manifestly not yet 
a contract of sale' • Closer to the truth would be an assertion 
that it may not be a contract of sale, depending on the parties' 
121. 
intentions. Happily, Mendelowitz' s central thesis revolves around 
a call for less dogmatism about the juristic nature of suspensive 
conditions and their effect upon contracts. He is, with respect, 
correct in suggesting that the effect of a suspensive condition 
46 
in a contract is not governed by a fixed rule of law. 
A parallel may be drawn with the recent development in the law 
pertaining to the effect on a contract of non-fulfilment of a 
suspensive condition. It was formerly believed that there was a 
fixed legal rule that, in the event of non-fulfilment the contract 
fell away automatically. However, the recent decision of Meyer 
B d & A h 
4 7 k · · 48 1 h h 1 1 v arnar o not er ma es it quite c ear t at no sue ega 
rule exists: The effect of non-fulfilment of a suspensive condition 
depends upon the intention of the parties. 49 
5. LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
Even before the decision in Tuckers Land v Strydom, a draft billSO 
was disseminated by the Law Commission 'with a view to eliminating 
the uncertainty and impurity which exists in our case law with regard 
to suspensive conditions in contracts of sale. The draft bill 
elicited support as well as opposition... On the question as to 
whether the matter should at this stage be regulated statutorily 
h d . f . . I 51 t ere oes not seem to exist consensus o opinion. I shall return 
to the draft bill shortly. 
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In Strydom's case Van Heerden JA made several remarks on the subject 
f 1 . f h . . 52 o statutory regu ation o t e position. He noted that the 
particular statutory prohibitions under consideration in Tuckers 
Land v Strydom had been amended before the case reached the Appellate 
Di vision in an attempt to prevent township developers from circum-
venting the prohibition. However, not all the relevant prohibitions 
in all the previous township development cases had been subsequently 
amended. The point was also made that even the use of unamended 
wording in the statutes did not necessarily mean that a court was 
bound to reach a conclusion in line with Corondimas. Yet the learned 
judge of appeal was, it is submitted, anticipating some sort of 
legislative reform, although one surmises that he may not have had 
in mind the all-embracing type of enactment now proposed as an amend-
ment to the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957: 
"Whenever it falls to be determined whether an agreement 
constitutes a contract of sale, the fact that the agreement 
or the operation of any part thereof is suspended or that 
passing of ownership from one party to the other is deferred, 
shall not prevent the agreement from constituting a contract 
53 
of sale unless a contrary intention appears." 
There would be little profit in quibbling with the particular wording 
of this amendment. More important is the question whether there 
should be legislative reform along these lines at all. 
submitted there should not be, for the following reasons: 
It is 
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1) Statutes require interpretation. Rules and canons are often 
invoked as a guide to interpretation. Yet their use often 
leads to rigidification of the law when, what in fact is needed 
is the flexibility of a simple common law proposition that 
the legal effect of a suspensive condition depends upon the 
intention of the parties. If their intention is not clear, 
as is of ten the case in practice, the · prima f acie approach 
of the common law will prevail, namely: The suspensive 
condition does not qualify the existence or the nature of 
the agreement of which 
. . 54 
1t 1s a part. 
2) The emphasized words will almost certainly lead to controversy 
about the onus of proof. The amendment effects a rebuttable 
presumption of law. Some rebuttable presumptions of law shift 
the legal burden, others shift merely the evidential burden.
55 
In this case, the emphasized words poirit to the conclusion 
that it is the legal burden which is shifted. 
56 
In other 
words, the plaintiff is not put to proof where the defendant 
contends that a particular suspensive condition has qualified 
the nature of the contract. The defendant bears the onus 
of proving on a balance of probabilities that the parties 
intended as much. Presumably, it is believed that policy 
demands such a result, but it is respectfully submitted 
that the law would be better served if any presumption 
in this regard affected the evidential burden only, 
ie where the plaintiff contends that the nature of the 
sale has been qualified by the condition, he will naturally 
3) 
124. 
bear both the legal and the evidential burdens. Where the 
defendant makes this contention, there will exist a prima 
facie inference against him that the condition does not qualify 
the nature of the contract, which inference the defendant 
will be under a duty to rebut by leading some evidence of 
a contrary common intention held by the parties, but the over-
all onus of proving what is the effect of the suspensive 
condition should still rest on the plaintiff. Such an approach 
would approximate that of the common law.
57 
Tuckers Land v Strydom leaves one in little doubt as to the 
proper general principles of law relating to the effect of 
suspensive conditions. It is submitted that, with a probable 
58 
exception in favour of future township development cases, 
the Appellate Division was not seeking to perpetuate the old 
law, despite its faults, as it has done before, notably in 
the instance f h d . 1 d · . 1 . 
59 
o t e un 1sc ose pr1nc1pa in agency. It 
must be clear that, in contracts of sale generally, no reliance 
at all can be placed on the Corondimas stance. The ref ore, 
in this regard the Law Commission's proposal is unnecessary 
as it does no more than attempt to declare the law as it 
already stands, with the addition of a possible contentious 
rebuttable presumption. The dangers of trying to compress 
all the law on a particular point into one significant sentence 
is a matter of rueful legal experience. 
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In summary, it may be that there is nothing seriously wrong with 
the type of legislation that has been proposed. It is simply that 
60 it is largely unnecessary. The common law can cope perfectly 
well. Whilst there is at the moment doctrinal impurity as regards 
township development cases, that is not so much the fault of the 
common law as the price that has been paid as a result of the highest 
court in the land admitting that its earlier declarations of the 
law on this point were faulty. To seek to eliminate the impurity 
by such broad legislation is overkill, it is submitted. 
6. CONCLUSION 
The initiative in Tuckers Land v Strydom to move away from the rigid 
rule in Corondimas is to be applauded. It would, however, be a 
poor solution to embrace another fixed rule in the form of the 
Odendaalsrust formula - any suggestion that a suspensive condition 
never. qualifies the existence or the nature of a contract is not 
to be commended. The true position must surely be that the presence 
of a suspensive condition in a contract gives rise to the prima 
facie inference that merely the exigible content of some or all 
of the obligations under the contract are suspended, and that neither 
the existence nor the nature of the agreement is qualified by the 
condition. However, such an inference may be rebutted by evidence 
of a contrary common intention held by the contracting parties. 
126. 
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